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Abstract 
This article analyses the recourse to religion as a source of law in the legal and political order 
of the European Union. It demonstrates that the legitimacy of religious input into law is 
recognised institutionally, symbolically and substantively. However, religious influence 
within the Union’s public order must accommodate cultural and humanist influences that can 
serve to limit attempts to reflect religious teaching in law and which are particularly 
restrictive of the influence of “outsider” faiths whose demands cannot be routed through 
culture and those faiths with extensive political ambitions. Thus, the Union’s approach is 
characterised by a complex and shifting balance between religious, cultural and humanist 
influences which is struck in a pluralist context that attempts to reconcile the differing 
balances between such influences in individual Member States with the need to maintain the 
open and sufficiently religiously neutral common European ethical framework necessary for 
the functioning of the Union as a polity. 
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The Recognition of Religion within 
the Constitutional and Political Order 
of the European Union 
 
1. Introduction 
This article examines the use of religion as a basis of law within the constitutional 
order of the EU. Religion plays this role by virtue of its recognition as part of the 
Union’s ethical inheritance, as a phenomenon which has a particular contribution to 
make to lawmaking and as part of a wider public morality which the Union and its 
Member States are entitled to legislate and to uphold. However, although religion is 
recognised as part of the Union’s constitutional order, this order is characterised by a 
balance between religious, humanist and cultural elements all of which can both 
reinforce or restrict each other’s influence. The Union has attached significant 
importance both to this notion of balance of conflicting influences and to that of 
respect for the ethical “inheritance” of Europe. This approach has permitted those 
religions with significant cultural roots in Europe and which are capable of 
reconciling themselves to humanist influences, to exercise greater influence over EU 
law than those faiths which lack such characteristics. 
Religion’s role as a basis of law in the EU legal order operates at three levels. The first 
section of the article analyses how the notion of an ethical inheritance characterised 
by a balance between religious, cultural and humanist influences has been 
recognised as a source of the Union’s constitutional values. The next section 
examines how religious institutions have been recognised as playing a particularly 
important and privileged role in the lawmaking process. However, it also shows 
how this role has conformed to the notions of balance and inheritance by showing 
how the recognition of religions as part of Civil Society has been linked to their role 
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at national level and has required them to relativise, and therefore partly secularise, 
their perspectives.   
Finally, the article addresses the role played by religion in the substantive law of the 
Union. It demonstrates how religious perspectives have been recognised as a valid 
basis for EU legislation and for derogation by Member States from EU law duties on 
the basis of its status as part of a broader public morality which Member States and 
the Union may use to promote particular communal norms and visions of the nature 
of a community. Under the EU’s legal order this public morality is pluralist and 
accommodates religion’s role in national cultural identities in that it encompasses 
divergent Member State moralities as well as a common European element. The 
common European element both restricts and reflects the pluralism of EU public 
morality in that in addition to facilitating Member State moral decisions, it requires 
that such decisions respect certain values such as pluralism, the rule of law and the 
fundamental rights commitments of the Union. These fundamental rights principles 
provide a broad ethical framework which is marked by Europe’s ethical inheritance 
and accommodates only those moral goals that are compatible with the notion of 
balance between religion and humanism and with certain common European 
cultural norms which have emerged from the balance between Christian and 
humanist influences which has characterised European history. Perspectives which 
are contrary to these norms are not recognised as valid elements of EU public 
morality. Thus, EU law protects, through its promotion of a particular public 
morality, the broad outlines of the settlement between religious and secular 
influences in Europe and the “way of life” it represents. Therefore, although the 
Union has adhered to strict formal neutrality in religious matters, faiths which lack 
cultural roots in Europe or which are incapable of reconciling themselves to the 
limitations on religious influence inherent in the notion of balance between religion 
and humanism will have a more limited influence over EU law and are implicitly 
characterised as contrary to the public morality of the Union. 
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2. Religion as a Source of the Union’s Constitutional 
Values 
European identity has been notably marked by both Christianity and humanism and 
there is no consensus in relation to the relationship between religion and the state at 
Member State level.1 Indeed, as Roy has stated, secularism and Christianity each 
provide a competing pole around which European identity can be defined.2 The 
tensions in this dual approach to religion and European identity became a major 
feature of the negotiations relating to the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty in 2003 
and focused on the issue of whether the preamble to the Treaty would contain a 
specific reference to either God or Christianity as a source of the Union’s 
constitutional values. The Catholic Church was particularly vocal on this issue. Pope 
John Paul II repeatedly called for the inclusion of “a reference to the religious and in 
particular the Christian heritage of Europe.”3 These requests were forcefully pursued by 
COMECE,4 the organisation representing the Catholic Bishops to the European 
Union. The Bishops argued that the Union’s values and its Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in particular were:  
“inspired by the Judaeo-Christian image of mankind”  
and that:  
“in order therefore to facilitate citizens’ identification with the values 
of the European Union, and to acknowledge that public power is not 
absolute, the COMECE secretariat recommends that a future 
Constitutional Treaty of the European Union should recognise the 
openness and ultimate otherness associated with the name of God. An 
                                                        
1 See J. Le Goff The Birth of Europe (Malden MA and Oxford UK, Blackwell 2005) 22 and J.T.S. 
Madeley, “European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality” in J.T.S. 
Madeley and Z. Enyedi (eds.), Church and State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of 
Neutrality (London, Frank Cass Publishing, 2003). 
2 O. Roy Secularism Confronts Islam (translated by George Holoch) (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2007). 
3 Paragraph 114, “Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Europa of His Holiness Pope 
John Paul II to the Bishops, Men and Women in the Consecrated Life and All the Lay Faithful on 
Jesus Christ Alive in His Church the Source of Hope for Europe”, 28 June 2003 quoted in The 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Elements for an Evaluation, COMECE, 11 March 
2005, http://www.comece.org/upload/pdf/pub_const_treaty_050311_EN.pdf (last visited 2 
March 2008). 
4 COMECE stands for ‘Commission des Episcopats de la Communauté Européenne’. 
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inclusive reference to the transcendent provides a guarantee for the 
freedom of the human person.”5 
The making of such a reference was actively opposed by secularist groups and states 
such as France with its strong separation of church and state.6 The initial draft 
proposed by the Constitutional Convention President Valery Giscard-d’Estaing 
suggested the following formulation: 
“Conscious that Europe is a continent that has brought forth 
civilisation; that its inhabitants, arriving in successive waves since the 
first ages of mankind, have gradually developed the values underlying 
humanism: equality of persons, freedom, respect for reason, 
Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, which, nourished first by the civilisations of 
Greece and Rome, characterised by spiritual impulse always present in 
its heritage and later by the philosophical currents of the 
Enlightenment,”7 
This reference to a “spiritual impulse” and the failure to refer explicitly to religion in 
general or to Christianity in particular was heavily criticised by religious groups and 
significant sections of the Convention which was tasked with drawing up the Treaty. 
The Catholic Church and several Member States argued that it was historically 
inaccurate to refer to the Enlightenment but not Christianity as a source of European 
values while a slew of amendments referring to either the Christian or Judaeo-
Christian roots of such values were put down by Convention members.8  The 
representative of the Polish Government to the Convention argued that “Religions 
and Christianity among them have been part and parcel of our continent’s history”9 while a 
Hungarian representative argued that “We Europeans know it very well that the Judeo-
                                                        
5 The Future of Europe, Political Commitment, Values and Religion: Contribution of the COMECE 
Secretariat to the Debate on the Future of the European Union in the European Convention, 
COMECE, Brussels, 21 May 2002. 
6 See “God Missing from EU Constitution” BBC News, 6 February 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2734345.stm (last visited 2 April 2008). 
7 Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 169, 18.7.2003, p. 1-150. 
8 See for example Suggestion for amendment of title by Mr Brok on behalf of the EPP Convention 
Group co signed by Antonio Tajani, member, and Mr Martikonis, member, available at: 
http://european-convention.eu.int/Docs/Treaty/pdf/1000/1000_Pre%20Brok%20EN.pdf 
(accessed 2 April 2008). Other similar amendments are available at: http://european-
convention.eu.int/amendments.asp?content=1000&lang=EN (last visited 2 April 2008). 
9 See “Personal Remarks by Professor Danuta Hubner, Representative of the Government of 
Poland to the European Convention Plenary Session, 27-28 February 2003” available at: 
http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/7171.pdf (last visited 5 April 2008). 
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Christian culture is at the very foundation of our idea of a common Europe”.10 On the other 
hand those whose views fell on the opposite side of Roy’s dual characterisation of 
the role of religion in European identity argued as Socialist MEP Josep Borrell argued 
that: 
“a lot of our values have been forged against the Church or the 
churches. If we are to celebrate historical heritages we should 
remember the whole story: with its religious wars, the massacres of 
the Crusades; the nights of Saint Bartholomew and the Inquisition’s 
autos-da-fe; Galileo and the forced evangelisations; the pogroms and 
the turning of a blind eye to fascism.[…] when it comes to democracy, 
human rights and equality, God is a recent convert.”11 
The final version of the Constitutional Treaty agreed by the Member States, amended 
the relevant section of the Preamble so that it read as follows: 
"Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values 
of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, 
democracy, equality and the rule of law."12 
This formula was retained in the Lisbon Treaty13 and, irrespective of whether it is 
ultimately ratified, represents that consensus view of the Member States in relation to 
the role of religion in the Union’s constitutional order. The Preamble characterises 
the constitutional values of the Union as deriving from a balance of religious, 
humanist and cultural influences. These three influences both reinforce, and are 
inconsistent with, each other. For instance, humanist influences can compliment 
religious influences due to the strong humanist tradition within Christianity which 
has also been reflected in European culture. On the other hand, the secularist 
elements of the humanist tradition, with its emphasis on human self-government, 
can also be restrictive of the influence which religious organisations, including 
Christian ones, may seek to assert over law and politics. 
                                                        
10 See “Speech Delivered by Jozsef Szajer, Hungary, at the European Convention, 27 February 
2007, available at: http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/9468.pdf (last visited 5 
April 2008). 
11 See “Contribution submitted by Mr Joseph Borrell Fontelles, member of the 
Convention: "Let’s Leave God Out of This" Brussels, 22 January 2003, CONV 501/03 available at: 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00501en03.pdf (last visited 5 April 
2008). 
12 Council of the European Union, Brussels, Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, 15 April 2008, 6655/08. 
13 Ibid. Preamble. 
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This approach involves, in contrast to strictly secular public orders, the recognition of 
a religious element to the Union’s constitutional values and public morality. On the 
other hand, the reference to religion is balanced by references to cultural and 
humanist influences, the latter of which have, as Taylor has argued,14 functioned so 
as to reduce the influence of religion over public life in Europe. Furthermore, these 
religious and humanist influences are recognised in their instrumental capacity as 
contributors to the emergence of values such as respect for individual rights, 
democracy, equality etc. Thus, the balance struck by the Union in this area grants 
humanist ideas significant influence by defining the various influences on the 
Union’s public morality as valuable by virtue of their contribution to certain forms of 
human government. In contrast to religiously based constitutions such as the Irish 
Constitution which defines its ultimate notion of the good in explicitly religious 
terms,15 the Preamble to the Lisbon Treaty portrays democracy and respect for 
individual rights as the ultimate good to which Europe’s cultural, religious and 
humanist influences have contributed. Thus, the role accorded to Europe’s religious 
inheritance is substantially counterbalanced by ideas which owe much to humanist 
notions of human self-government.  
As the text of the Preamble makes clear, this balance between religious and humanist 
influences is also influenced by cultural factors. The predominant contemporary 
view of culture is of a broad ethnographic or anthropological state of affairs which 
represents a broad “way of life” encompassing established patterns in relation to 
both values and beliefs and matters such as food, clothing or leisure activities. 16 The 
invocation of cultural influences themselves and the notion of the importance of 
Europe’s “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance” (emphasis added) imply that the 
fundamental constitutional norms of the Union are influenced by and therefore 
reinforce, a shared European way of life. Such an approach entails greater 
recognition of those forms of religion which have been historically predominant in 
                                                        
14 C. Taylor, A Secular Age, (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 2007). 
15 See Bunreacht na h-Éireann, Preamble. 
16 See F. Inglis, Culture (Cambridge UK and Malden MA, USA Polity Press, 2004),  28-29 also C. 
Barker, “Culture” in The SAGE Dictionary of Cultural Studies, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi 
Sage 2004) 45. 
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Europe, which have left a greater mark on national cultures and which are therefore 
compatible with established European cultural norms. Indeed, the Union has been at 
pains to ensure that EU law does not undermine the cultural or institutional role of 
particular religions at Member State level, including, for instance the arrangement of 
leisure periods around particular religious patterns or the role of particular religions 
as sources of national identity.17 This approach achieved explicit recognition in 
Article 17(1) which states that:  
“The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national 
law of churches and religious associations or communities in the 
Member States”.18  
The importance attached to culture and to the notion of inheritance can therefore be 
seen as granting certain forms of religion greater influence over the Union’s public 
morality than others. In particular, as Europe’s “religious inheritance” is 
overwhelmingly Christian, Christianity is likely to exercise a greater influence than 
other faiths over a public morality which draws on a mixture of Europe’s “cultural, 
humanist and religious inheritance”. This was the view of the Catholic Bishops who 
regarded the Preamble as “implicitly referring to the centre of this [religious] tradition, 
which is Christianity.”19 Indeed, the importance of balancing religious influences with 
those of the humanist tradition and cultural norms can be seen as implicitly 
categorising forms of religion which are anti-humanist or which contravene other 
European cultural values are contrary to European public morality.  
This balancing of religious, humanist and cultural elements was criticised from both 
religious and secular perspectives. Although, as noted above, the Catholic Bishops 
                                                        
17 In relation to institutional issues see Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation Article 2(5) OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, in relation to 
leisure periods see Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, OJ L299/9 
18.11.2003. 
18 Article 17(1), Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 
C 115/47 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF.  
19 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Elements for an Evaluation, COMECE, 11 
March 2005, http://www.comece.org/upload/pdf/pub_const_treaty_050311_EN.pdf (last visited 
5 May 2008).  
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welcomed what they regarded as an implicit reference to Christianity, they 
nevertheless stated that:  
“An explicit mentioning of God or Christianity would have been a 
strong signal supporting the identity of Europe. It is therefore 
regrettable that neither the European Convention nor the 
Intergovernmental Conference agreed to the inclusion of such a 
reference. As a matter of historical fact, it is Christianity and the 
Christian message that have built the ‘inheritance of Europe’ from 
which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and 
inalienable rights of the human person, democracy, equality and the 
rule of law.”20  
On the other hand, a group of secularist Convention members argued that: 
“the wording of the Preamble was already stretching the tolerance of 
non-Christians to the limit [and that]religion has not always been an 
unqualified blessing for Europe.”21 
The balance struck by the Preamble is, indeed, in some ways intellectually 
unsatisfying in that it is neither clearly secularist nor fully endorses the theory of the 
religious basis of European public morality. The academic debate has reflected this 
lack of clarity. On the one hand, some have argued that the Preamble’s failure to 
grant specific recognition to Christianity as the source of Europe’s common moral 
and political norms is unduly secularist and misleading. Weigel for instance argues 
that the Preamble presents a “false and distorting” view on the basis that “Christianity 
is the story that has arguably had more to do with constituting Europe than anything else.”22 
The Treaty, he suggests, embodies a secular view of Europe which “cannot identify 
with precision and accuracy, the sources of Europe’s commitments to human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.”23 Weigel’s critique draws heavily on Weiler’s Un’Europa 
Cristiana24 which is equally critical. Weiler argues that the failure to mention God or 
Christianity in the Preamble represented, according to Weiler, an “EU-enforced laicité 
                                                        
20 Ibid. 
21 Convention Meeting of 5-6 June 2003, Reform of Institutions and Revisions of Parts I and IV of 
the Draft. Comments of members Borrell, Duhamel and Abitol. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+PRESS+BI-20030606-
1+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last visited 2 April 2008). 
22 G. Weigel The Cube and the Cathedral: Europe, America and Politics without God (New York, 
Basic Books, 2005)  70. 
23 Ibid. 85. 
24 J.H.H. Weiler, Un'Europa Cristiana: Un saggio esplorativo, (Milan, BUR Saggi, 2003). 
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on European public life.”25 The approach embodied in the Constitutional and Lisbon 
Treaties, he suggests, endorses the right to freedom from religion which he sees as 
partisan and less desirable than freedom of religion.  
This approach has rightly been criticised for failing to take account of the full picture 
of the relationship between Christianity and liberalism which has often been 
characterised by conflict. As Cvijic and Zucca note, Weiler’s  
“claim that the liberal ideal derives directly from Christian philosophy 
and that it is accordingly illogical that the Preamble of the European 
Constitution invokes humanist values but refuses to make a direct 
allusion to Christian values, fails to give due recognition to the full 
picture of the relationship between humanism and Christianity.”26 
Indeed, although Christian thought and Christian humanism in particular, played an 
influential and perhaps indispensable role in the development of principles such as 
individual autonomy and equality, such principles have also on occasion come into 
conflict with Christian teachings and in particular, the desire of many Christian 
Churches to have religious teachings in areas such as the family and sexuality, 
reflected in the law of the land. The Catholic Church has, in the past, explicitly 
rejected notions such as freedom of religion27 and even today has endorsed the use of 
the criminal law to promote and enforce adherence to biblical standards of sexual 
behaviour. Although it has come to accept the legitimacy of the secular state and to 
actively embrace liberal democracy, such acceptance has, as Roy points out,28 on 
occasion, been prompted by considerations of realpolitik rather than theological 
reform. Furthermore, Weigel’s complaint that the Preamble does not identify the 
source of Europe’s commitments to democracy and human rights not only appears to 
assume a congruent relationship between these principles and Christianity but also 
fails to take into account that such commitments can arise from multiple sources, or 
                                                        
25 See discussion in A.J. Menendez, “Review of A Christian Europe”, European Law Review, 30, No. 
1, February 2005, 133. 
26 S. Cvijic and L. Zucca, “Does the European Constitution need Christian Values?” OJLS Vol. 24, 
No. 4 (2004), 744. 
27 Propositions 15 and 78, The Syllabus of Errors, The Holy See, 8 December 1864 (H. Dezinger 
(ed.) The Sources of Catholic Dogma, (B. Herder Book Company 1957). See also the Papal 
Encyclical Quanta Curat 1864 in Carlen (ed.), The Papal Encyclicals, Vol. I 1740-1878 at 382. 
28 O. Roy Secularism Confronts Islam (translated by George Holoch) (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 21-22. 
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as Dershowitz suggests, from historical experience of injustice and oppression rather 
than from religious worldviews.29 
On the other hand, secularist critiques have failed to note the degree to which 
religion (and, implicitly Christianity), is in fact recognised as part of European public 
morality and is accorded special treatment by EU law in other areas.30 Thus, 
Menendez’s defence of the Preamble on the basis that:  
“defining constitutional ethics in Christian terms may obstruct the 
integration of those with other or no religious beliefs who face other 
barriers to full membership of our society”31  
fails to give adequate recognition to the fact that by recognising Europe’s religious 
and cultural “inheritance” as part of European public morality, the Treaty does in fact, 
recognise that Christian perspectives partly constitute the Union’s constitutional 
ethics, albeit that such recognition is implicit and balanced by the simultaneous 
recognition of humanist influences. 
The fact that neither those who see European identity as secular nor those who see it 
as Christian were satisfied by the approach adopted in Lisbon Treaty, underlines the 
fact that the Union has identified a balance between these two influences rather an 
outright preference for one or the other as characteristic of its public morality. The 
Preamble recognises religion and religious values as a part of the mix of influences 
which constitute the values which underpin the Union’s constitutional order. In this 
way the EU’s constitutional values reflect what MacCormick calls “value pluralism” 
under which conflicts between differing rights or approaches are seen as the norm 
and are resolved through balancing conflicting elements rather than through 
according priority to one over another in a hierarchical fashion.32 Thus, religion is not 
entirely excluded from a public role and the Union does not follow a strictly secular 
                                                        
29 A. Dershowitz, Rights from Wrongs: A Secular Theory of the Origins of Rights (New York, Basic 
Books, 2004). 
30 n. 17 above. 
31 See Menendez, above n. 25. 
32 J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice” in G. de Burca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.) The European 
Court of Justice, (The Academy of European Law, European University Institute, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 64-65. 
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approach under which religious norms and ideas are by definition excluded from 
influence over public life. However, it is true that the recognition of religion is 
limited and, at least formally, denomination-neutral. Although the notion of 
inheritance and the influence of cultural matters do mean that forms of religion 
which were historically dominant in Europe are likely to exercise greater influence 
over the EU’s public morality, the Union has pointedly refused to associate explicitly 
itself with a particular religion. Indeed the EU has repeatedly indicated its rhetorical 
commitment to the equality of religious and other forms of belief or philosophy, for 
example in relation to the privileges of religious bodies in the Framework Directive33 
or in the Declaration on the Status of Churches34 both of which conferred equal 
recognition on other forms of belief or philosophy. It is this formal neutrality which 
religious groups, most notably the Catholic Church, have found objectionable. 
Beyond the formal neutrality of its provisions, what is notable about the approach 
reflected in the Preamble to the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties is that while 
religion is recognised and may therefore play some role in the determination of 
public policy, recognition is also granted to other influences such as humanism 
which may limit the realisation of the ambitions of religions in the political and legal 
arenas. Furthermore, both religious and humanist values are seen in the Preamble as 
instruments leading to the recognition of values such as equality and respect for 
individual rights which have, as some contributors to the debate surrounding the 
Preamble pointed out, had complex and sometimes antagonistic relationships to 
certain forms of religion, including Christianity. Thus while recognition is granted to 
religion such recognition is counterbalanced by humanist values which emphasis 
notions of human autonomy and self-government independent of any appeal to the 
divine.  
                                                        
33 Article 4(2) of the Directive states: “churches and other public or private organisations the ethos 
of which is based on religion or belief” (Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework 
for equal treatment in employment and occupation Article 2(5) OJ L 303, 2.12.2000). 
34 Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations, Declaration No.11 to 
the last act of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0133 provides that: 
“The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and 
religious associations or communities in the Member States. 
The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional 
organisations” 
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This notion of a public morality characterised by a partly-contested balance between 
religious, humanist and cultural influences is repeated in other areas of EU law. 
Religions which lack deep cultural roots in Europe or which are incapable of 
reconciling themselves to the accommodation of humanist influences, will struggle to 
achieve influence under such a public morality. Indeed, such religions can even be 
seen as contrary to the public morality espoused by the Union. Thus, the EU has a 
preference for those forms of religion which are compatible with the accommodation 
of the humanist and secular elements of European culture. Such compatibility is not 
an easy matter for all religions as the accommodation of humanist influences can 
require significant limitation of the influence of religion over law and political life. 
Such approaches have been criticised as a violation of the duty of neutrality towards 
religion. Modood argues that it is “a contradiction to require both that the state be neutral 
about religion and that the state should require religions with public ambitions to give them 
up.”35 However, it is unclear how a polity which is committed to values such as 
individual autonomy and gender equality could possibly uphold such values while 
simultaneously refusing to limit the realisation of the desires of forms of religion 
which, for instance, desire to mould law and policy in line with patriarchal religious 
teachings in relation to sexuality and gender. Certain limitations on the political and 
legal ambitions of religion are an indispensable element of liberal democracy. The 
fact that they impinge to a greater degree on forms of religion which reject aspects of 
key liberal values does not mean that such limitations violate the religious neutrality 
of the polity in question. It is true that, had the EU chosen merely to affirm its 
commitment to democracy and individual rights and had remained silent on the 
sources of its commitments to such principles, the issue of religious neutrality need 
not have arisen. However, by choosing to open up the contentious issue of the source 
of its ethical commitments and recognising an instrumental role for religion in the 
determination of their content, the Union does implicitly associate itself with certain 
religious traditions. 
                                                        
35 T. Modood, ‘Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism and the ‘Recognition’ of Religious Groups’ 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 6, (1998), 378 at 393. 
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This approach underlines that importance attached to the notion of balance between 
religious and humanist influences within the public morality of the Union. 
Preserving such balance means that approaches which involve a negation of any of 
the elements will be contrary to the Union’s notions of public morality. This 
principle, which will be discussed in more detail below, can cut both ways. Just as an 
attempt to introduce Sharia as the basis of a legal system has been identified as 
unacceptable on grounds of its failure to respect the autonomy of the public sphere 
and individual autonomy in the private sphere,36 approaches which are particularly 
restrictive of religion and which would involve significant restrictions of religious 
liberty such as restrictions on religious clothing in the workplace, may also be 
problematic in the light of the Union’s commitments to religious freedom.37  
 
3. Recognition of the Role of Religion in Lawmaking 
Religious influence over EU law is not restricted to acting a source of constitutional 
values. Religious perspectives have also been recognised as having a special and 
privileged role to play in lawmaking. This section analyses the approach adopted by 
the Union in this field and suggests that, in common with the role of religion in the 
constitutional values of the Union outlined above, the role granted to religious 
bodies in lawmaking is characterised by a balance between religious, humanist and 
cultural influences. It begins with an analysis of the informal links between religious 
bodies and EU institutions before considering the status granted to such bodies by 
the Treaty. It notes how religious perspectives have been recognised as a necessary 
and uniquely important element of lawmaking but concludes by showing how, on 
the other hand, the Union’s recognition of the religious contribution to lawmaking in 
the context of Civil Society has the effect of relativising and, thereby partly 
secularising, religious perspectives. 
                                                        
36 R. McCrea ‘Limitations on Religion in a Liberal Democratic Polity: Christianity and Islam and 
the Partial Secularity of the European Union’ Yearbook of European Law, 2008, 195. 
37 See for example Directive 2000/78 which requires that reasonable adjustments be made in 
order to facilitate religious employees in the workplace. See also section 5.2 below. 
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Recognition that churches and religious organisations are, by virtue of their religious 
nature and perspective, valid contributors to policy formation and law-making 
implies, at least in theory, that religious perspectives may form part of law and 
public policy. This is an approach which deviates from secular notions of the state. 
For instance, theorists such as Rawls and Habermas have argued that the justification 
of law or policy on religious grounds is inconsistent with a liberal constitutional 
order. Rawls suggests that  
“the self-understanding of the constitutional state has developed 
within the framework of a contractualist tradition that relies on 
‘natural’ reason, in other words solely public arguments to which 
supposedly all persons have equal access. The assumption of a 
common human reason forms the basis of justification for a secular 
state that no longer depends on religious legitimation.”38 
Similarly, Habermas advocates that state officials (including politicians) must “justify 
their political statements independently of their religious convictions or world views”39 and 
that  
“Majority rule turns into oppression if the majority deploys religious 
arguments in the process of political opinion and will formation and 
refuses to offer those publicly accessible justifications which the losing 
minority be it secular or of a different faith, is able to follow.”40 
However, in line with its rejection of purely secular notions of Europe’s 
constitutional ethics, the EU does recognise the validity, importance and particular 
nature of the contribution of religious bodies to lawmaking and would therefore 
seem, at least in theory, to accept the notion that the law may, at least in part, be 
based on religious arguments. Religious bodies have had informal links to European 
Institutions for many years.41 The Catholic Church (COMECE), the Protestant 
Churches (KEK-CEC) and Jewish, Muslim, Orthodox and Humanist groups all have 
full time representation in Brussels.42 These informal links to European institutions 
                                                        
38 J. Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere” European Journal of Philosophy, 14:1 1-25 (2006), 
4 referring to J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993.  
39 Ibid. 9. 
40Ibid. 12. 
41 See T. Jansen, “Europe and Religions: the Dialogue between the European Commission and 
Churches or Religious Communities”, Social Compass 47(1), 2000, 103-112. 
42 M. Rynkowski “Remarks on Art. I-52 of the Constitutional Treaty: new Aspects of the European 
Ecclesiastical Law? German Law Journal Vol. 6 No. 11, 1 November 2005. 
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were largely developed at the behest of religious groups themselves,43 however, the 
European Commission in particular has come to see such links as potential 
contributors to the attainment of its broader political goals. Links between religious 
bodies and the Union were placed on a more formal basis in 1992 when Commission 
President Jacques Delors established a programme called “A Soul for Europe” whose 
aim was described by the Commission as “giving a spiritual and ethical dimension to the 
European Union”.44 The facilitation of religious contributions to policy making was 
not merely a result of a desire to accommodate religious perspectives within EU law 
and policy but was also seen as an opportunity to use religious organisations to 
develop the European Civil Society which was regarded as necessary to sustain 
European integration. Commission President Delors made this point explicitly in an 
address to the “Soul for Europe” initiative in which he stated that: 
“We won't succeed with Europe solely on the basis of legal expertise or 
economic know-how. [...] If in the next ten years we have not managed 
to give a soul to Europe, to give it spirituality and meaning, the game 
will be up”45 
thus explicitly linking the participation of religious bodies in European public life 
and the accommodation of religious perspectives in the EU’s activities, to the 
sustainability of the Union as a political project. Subsequently, the Bureau of 
European Policy Advisors (BEPA),46 which reported to the Commission President, 
became responsible for what was described at “Dialogue with Religions, Churches, 
Humanisms.”47 This process of dialogue consisted mainly of a series of seminars and 
discussion groups on the role of religious bodies in the Union.48 The fact the EU 
                                                        
43 n.41 above. 
44 See European Commission, Archives of GOPA, Dialogue with Religions, Churches and 
Humanisms –Issues: A Soul for Europe. 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/archives/activities/dialogue_religions_humanis
ms/index_en.htm (last visited 6 May 2008). 
45 Quoted in H. Alfeyev ‘Christian Witness to Uniting Europe: A View from a Representative of the 
Russian Orthodox Church’ The Ecumenical Review, January 2003. See also European Commission, 
Archives of GOPA, Dialogue with Religions, Churches and Humanisms –Issues: A Soul for Europe. 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/archives/activities/dialogue_religions_humanis
ms/index_en.htm (last visited 7 May 2008). 
46 This organisation was previously known as the Forward Studies Unit and the Group of Policy 
Advisors. 
47 Rynkowski, n. 42 above. 
48 See Bureau of European Policy Advisers, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/index_en.htm (last visited 18 May 2008). 
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institutions reached out to religious bodies in this way underlines the degree to 
which the Union has recognised religious bodies as playing a particularly important 
role in policy making. The contributions of other elements of Civil Society have not 
been sought out or recognised in this way.  
The specific recognition of “churches” in the context of this “Dialogue with Religions, 
Churches, Humanisms” also provides some indication of the influence of cultural and 
historical factors. Although the term has been applied to certain newer religious 
movements such as Scientology, churches are a Christian concept which is generally 
still taken to refer to the organisational structure or branches of the Christian 
religion. Christian religious structures also fall within the term “religions” so the 
singling out of churches can be seen as indicative of the prominent role European 
institutions expected the religious institutions of traditionally dominant Christian 
churches to play in this dialogue. Indeed, the importance of cultural matters in the 
Union’s approach to religion and in particular its desire to respect the public role of 
traditionally dominant Christian denominations at Member State level is seen 
elsewhere in EU law. The 1998 Declaration on the Status of Churches49 appended to the 
Amsterdam Treaty also signified a formalisation of the Union’s relationship to 
religious bodies in that it stated that the Union “respects and does not prejudice the 
status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the 
Member States” thus recognising the status of such bodies at national level in a formal 
way. Indeed, this deference towards the cultural role of religion in Member States 
has also been reflected in the Union’s substantive legislation, most notably in relation 
to employment law and religiously managed healthcare and educational 
institutions.50  
The Commission White Paper on Governance of 2001 also indicated the openness of 
the Union to the recognition of the role of religious perspectives in policy making by 
recognising the “particular contribution” of “churches and religious communities” to 
policy making.51 Thus, not only did the Commission recognise religious bodies as 
                                                        
49 n.34 above. 
50 n. 17 above. 
51 European Governance: A White Paper COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels 25.7.2001. 
Ronan McCrea 
                                                                                                                                      
17 
particularly important elements of Civil Society, it also recognised the particular 
nature of their contribution. Such recognition indicates a view that religious bodies 
have particular qualifications or that they bring perspectives to lawmaking which are 
other institutions are not capable of providing to the same degree. The combination 
of the recognition of both the importance and the particular nature of religious 
contributions by the Commission underlines the notion of religious bodies as 
particularly important and privileged players in the articulation of Europe’s public 
morality by Civil Society. Thus, the Union appears to recognise to some degree the 
historic role of churches and religions as moral guardians with a special authority on 
moral matters. Of course, morality is not the sole preserve of religious bodies, 
however the Union’s explicit references to churches along with its identification of 
the “particular contribution” of religious bodies in this regard would appear to defer 
to the historic role played in Western societies by religions in relation to notions of 
morality.52 
This identification of religious perspectives as necessary and particularly important 
elements of lawmaking was reflected in the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties which 
explicitly recognised this “particular contribution” by according (following a 
strenuous campaign on the part of the Catholic Church)53 a privileged consultative 
status to religious groups. While Article 11(2) of the Lisbon Treaty commits the 
Union to maintaining an “an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative 
associations and Civil Society”54 Article 17 singles out religious bodies and specifically 
undertakes to maintain a dialogue with them. The Article, which also incorporates 
the 1998 Declaration on the Status of Churches, reads:  
“1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under 
national law of churches and religious associations or communities in 
the Member States.  
2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of 
philosophical and non-confessional organisations. 
                                                        
52 J. Casanova Public Religions in the Modern World (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and 
London, 1994). 
53 See “The Future of Europe: Political Commitment, Values and Religion: Contribution of the 
COMECE Secretariat to the Debate on the Future of the European Union in the European 
Convention” COMECE, Brussels, 21 May 2002. 
54 n. 18 above, Article 11(2). 
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3. Recognising their identity and their specific contribution, the Union 
shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with these 
churches and organisations."55 
The granting of this special status was strenuously opposed by secularist 
organisations which characterised the Article as “incompatible with secularism” as 
challenging “the principle of separation of church and state” 56 and as granting religion “a 
privileged status in European public policy making”.57 Although the dialogue is open to 
all religions, the combination in the same Article of the recognition of the national 
status of churches with the recognition of the special importance of religious 
contributions to policy making, links the recognition accorded to and role played by, 
religious bodies at EU level with the national status of such bodies as the identity 
and contribution of such bodies will be influenced by their role in the lives of 
particular Member States.  
The Union does therefore seem to accord religious perspectives a particular degree of 
recognition and facilitation in policymaking. Religious bodies are recognised as 
elements of Civil Society with which the Union will maintain a dialogue. However, 
such bodies are seen as making a “specific contribution” and as representing a 
particularly important part of Civil Society which is accorded specific and explicit 
recognition. By recognising the specificity of the contribution of religious bodies to 
law making, the Union implicitly identifies religious perspectives as a legitimate and 
necessary element of policy formation. Furthermore, the recognition of the right of 
religious bodies to be consulted by lawmaking institutions in a separate article from 
that dedicated to Civil Society in general, characterises this religious contribution to 
lawmaking as particularly important. 
Nevertheless, in line with the Union’s approach in other areas, this facilitation of 
religious influence in lawmaking is balanced by other influences which draw on the 
humanist and secular influences within European public morality.  First, Article 17 
itself also recognises the equal status of “philosophical and non-confessional 
                                                        
55 Ibid. Article 17. 
56 See “Catholics Join European NGOs in Coalition in Appeal to Convention Not to Give Religion 
Unfair Influence in Constitutional Treaty” U.S. Newswire, 22 May 2003, 
http://www.forf.org/news/2003/cje.html (last visited 15 March 2008). 
57 Ibid. 
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organisations”. One of the most prominent of these is the International Humanist and 
Ethical Union which has been part of the dialogue with European institutions and 
which has a vigorously secular outlook. Furthermore the fact that, even in an article 
dedicated to the facilitation of religions, the Union felt constrained to provide equal 
recognition to non-confessional groups, indicates that, although religion is 
recognised within the legal and political arenas, such perspectives will not 
necessarily be predominant. Indeed, the importance of religious bodies is seen in line 
with humanist approaches, as deriving, to a significant degree, from their human 
dimensions and the attachment of individuals to religious organisations. This 
approach is echoed in the Commission’s documents in relation to the dialogue with 
“Religions Churches and Humanisms” which stresses the status of religious bodies as 
part of Civil Society and which justifies dialogue with such bodies on the grounds 
that:  
“They are representatives of European citizens. In this respect, 
Community law protects the churches and religious communities, as 
they would any other partner in Civil Society”.58 
Thus, while the historical and cultural role of religions in Europe as moral guardians 
means that the “specific contribution” of churches and religious communities is 
recognised by the Union, and while this contribution is seen as representing a 
particularly important perspective, the right of such bodies to play a part in the 
lawmaking process is seen as deriving from their historic role as moral guardians 
and from their status as representative organisations, rather than from the inherent 
truth of their message or the importance of ensuring compliance with divine 
mandates. Indeed it is simply inconceivable that EU legislation would explicitly base 
itself on revelation or seek to justify itself on the basis of its compatibility with a 
religious text. EU legislation is not justified in theological terms and one does not, for 
example find biblical justifications in the preambles of Directives and Regulations 
which instead rely on what might be termed generally accessible justifications. Even 
                                                        
58 See: “Commission Document on Dialogue with Religions, Churches and Humanisms: 
Introduction to the legal aspects of the relations between the European Union and the 
communities of faith and conviction.” Group of Policy Advisers, available at: 
http://ec.europe.dgs/policy_advisers/archives/activities/dialogue_religions_humanisms/legal_e
n.htm (accessed 5 April 2008). 
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legislation such as the Preamble to the Framework Directive, a piece of legislation 
which touches on religious issues to a significant degree, justifies the measures 
contained therein on the basis of non-religious goals such as their contribution to the 
“attainment of a high level of employment and social protection, raising the standard of living 
and quality of life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity.”59 Indeed, the statements of 
the Commission, the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights and EU 
Enlargement policy have all indicated that a failure to maintain limits on religious 
influence over the political and legal domains is incompatible with membership of 
the Union.60 In fact, the Union’s approach in relation to the role of religion in 
lawmaking can be seen as reflecting the notion of balance between religious 
worldviews and humanist perspectives which stress human autonomy and reject use 
of the idea of law as subordinate to, or merely a means to promote, divine authority 
on earth.  
Furthermore, the Union also balances this religious influence and relativises religious 
perspectives by providing such recognition in the context of Civil Society. The 
manner in which the dialogue with religious bodies has operated demonstrates that 
the Union has refused to associate itself explicitly with particular religious 
viewpoints and has instead operated a process in which differing religious, and even 
non-religious, perspectives have been accorded equal recognition. As noted above, 
Article 17 specifically recognises the equal status of “philosophical and non-confessional 
organisations”, thus recognising the legitimacy of non-religious world views. Not 
only have avowedly secularist and atheist groups taken part in the dialogue, new 
religious movements, which have received little protection in other areas of EU law, 
have also been permitted to participate. Rynkowski notes that members of what he 
calls “sects”: “are present during meetings, even those concerning combating the illegal 
activities of sects”61 He argues that their presence is “inappropriate” and that the 
Commission “is a hostage of political correctness”.62 Whatever the merits of these 
                                                        
59 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for 
equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303/16 2.12.2000, Paragraph 11. 
60 n.36 above. 
61 n. 42 above. 
62 Ibid. 
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arguments (and neither reasons supporting the inappropriateness of their presence 
nor indeed a method of distinguishing “sects” from bona fide religions, are 
provided), the denomination-neutral approach adopted by the Commission 
highlights both the conspicuous reluctance of the Union to grant recognition to, or 
associate itself officially with, any individual religious denomination and the 
commitment to balancing religious and humanist perspectives seen in the Union’s 
public morality.  
Thus, the Union does recognise and privilege religious bodies as particularly 
important articulators of, and contributors to, European public morality and on this 
basis, acknowledges them as important contributors to law and policy making. 
However, the fact that such recognition is provided within the context of Civil 
Society (albeit with privileged status therein), requires that religious bodies exercise 
the rights attached to such recognition in the context of a process which relativises 
their claims. Furthermore, by participating in a process in which religious bodies are 
required to persuade lawmakers and to articulate their religious contribution in a 
forum which equally recognises different religious, or anti-religious perspectives, 
religious bodies implicitly accept that legitimacy of secular political institutions 
along with the reality that the ultimate decision in relation to matters of law lies with 
such institutions. Indeed, as the justifications provided by Commission President 
Delors for the original dialogue with religious groups made clear, the Union’s 
engagement with religious groups has been partly related to efforts to create a 
European public sphere and to enhance the legitimacy and sustainability of the 
political institutions of the Union.63  Thus, the Union’s approach to the facilitation of 
religious contributions to lawmaking can be seen as balancing religious and 
humanist influences by recognising religion as one influence amongst many in the 
process of law making. Engagement in such a process requires religious groups to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of other religious and non-religious worldviews. Such 
acceptance is not an easy matter for all religions. As Habermas points out: 
                                                        
63 See “The New Crusade; Fighting for God in a Secular Europe, Conservative Christians, the 
Vatican and Islamic Militants”, Newsweek, 1 November 2004. 
http://www.religiousconsultation.org/News_Tracker/the_new_crusade_fighting_for_God_in_a_secul
ar_Europe.htm (last visited 18 June 2008). 
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“missionary doctrines such as Christianity or Islam are intrinsically 
intolerant of other beliefs. Love of your neighbour includes active care 
for his or her salvation. And because, -as Thomas Aquinas, among 
others, argued –eternal salvation has absolute priority over all goods, 
care for the salvation of others does not per se exclude the application 
of force to convert someone to the right faith or to protect them 
against heresy.”64 
The recognition of such groups within the context of Civil Society is therefore based 
on certain prerequisites, thus: 
“The liberal state expects that the religious consciousness of the 
faithful will become modernised by way of cognitive adaptation to the 
individualistic and egalitarian nature of the laws of the secular 
community”65 
Thus recognition of religious communities in this way can be seen as encouraging a 
process where each religious body “locks the moral and legal principles of secular society 
onto its own ethos”66 and where religious bodies in general “have to make the civic 
principle of equal inclusion their own.”67 As Habermas acknowledges, such a process 
means “accepting mutually exclusive validity claims”68 which requires a neutralisation of 
the “practical impact of the cognitive dissonance”69 this produces.  
Indeed, it is notable how recognition of religion in the context of a pluralist Civil 
Society linked to secular political institutions has pushed religious bodies to phrase 
their contributions in precisely the kind of generally accessible reasons required by 
theorists such as Rawls and which appeal to views of “the good life” which are not 
necessarily religious. For instance COMECE justified its calls for the recognition of 
the specific contribution of Churches and religious organisations on the basis that 
churches: 
“are committed to serve society –inter alia, in the fields of education, 
culture, media and social work – and they play an important role in 
                                                        
64 J. Habermas “Intolerance and Discrimination” I.CON, Volume 1, Number 1, 2003, pp2-12, 7. 
65 Ibid.  6. 
66 Ibid. 8. 
67 Ibid. 10. 
68 Ibid. 12. 
69 Ibid. 
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promoting mutual respect, participation, citizenship, dialogue and 
reconciliation between the peoples of Europe, East and West”70 
Their campaign in favour of the making of a reference to Christianity in the Preamble 
was justified on similarly generally accessible grounds, with the Bishops stressing 
Christianity’s role in developing human rights and democracy and suggesting that 
such a reference “would have been a strong signal supporting the identity of Europe”.71 
Similarly, Pope John II also declared that the Church was committed to “fully 
respecting the secular nature of the institutions”72 of the Union thus acknowledging the 
legitimacy and contribution of secular political institutions.  
The Church’s invocation of European identity not only underlines the instrumental 
polity building aspects of the process, it also demonstrates, along with the reliance on 
the facilitative role of religion in relation to religiously neutral civic activities and 
values, how in engaging in the lawmaking process at EU level, religious bodies have 
internalised what Habermas termed “civic principles” and “the moral and legal 
principles of secular society.” Thus, while religion is recognised by the Union, this 
recognition of religious influence is balanced by the nature of the forum in which 
such recognition is granted which requires religions to relativise their claims and 
accept the legitimacy of other worldviews.  
The Union’s Treaty commitment to engagement with Civil Society show that it 
recognises that its law and policy making must be informed by diverse perspectives 
and views of the good life from across Europe. Thus, Civil Society plays a role in 
forming a European public morality which informs the Union’s lawmaking. Religion, 
as noted above, has been recognised by the Union as a particularly important 
contributor to this public morality. This public morality enables certain religious 
traditions to exercise greater influence than others. The explicit recognition of the 
                                                        
70 The Future of Europe, Political Commitment, Values and Religion: Contribution of the COMECE 
Secretariat to the Debate on the Future of the European Union in the European Convention, 
COMECE, Brussels, 21 May 2002. 
http://www.comece.org/upload/pdf/secr_conv1_020521_en.pdf (last visited 18 June 2008). 
71 The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: Elements for an Evaluation, COMECE, 11 
March 2005, http://www.comece.org/upload/pdf/pub_const_treaty_050311_EN.pdf (last visited 
18 June 2008). 
72 Paragraph 114, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia In Europa Of His Holiness Pope 
John Paul II To The Bishops Men And Women In The Consecrated Life And All The Lay Faithful On 
Jesus Christ Alive In His Church The Source Of Hope For Europe, 28 June 2003. 
The Recognition of Religion 
 
 
24 
status and role of national churches in Article 17 encourages the according of greater 
weight to the contributions of religions which are culturally and institutionally 
entrenched at national level. Furthermore, as was the case in relation to the influence 
of religion in relation to the constitutional values of the Union set out in the Preamble 
to the Lisbon Treaty, the recognition of religion’s role in lawmaking in the context of 
Civil Society renders those forms of religion which can reconcile themselves to the 
notion of balance between humanist and religious influences and to the European 
cultural norms, more able to exercise influence than religions which lack such 
characteristics and which are, for instance, anti-humanist in nature or which cannot 
acknowledge the legitimacy of secular political institutions. Thus, the cultural 
influence and long (though still contested) tradition of humanism within the 
historically dominant Christian churches render them more able to exert influence 
within the structures established by the Union to engage with religious perspectives 
than outsider religions such as Islam which have had less cultural impact on Europe 
or which may have more antagonistic attitudes to humanist principles.  
 
4. The Pluralist Public Morality of EU Law 
The recognition of religious perspectives within EU law is not restricted to 
institutional and symbolic roles. In contrast to libertarian views of the relationship 
between law and morality which stress the idea of morality as a largely private 
matter and see the promotion of communal moral standards by the law as legitimate 
only when necessary to prevent harm to others,73 EU law does permit the promotion 
of certain communal, moral or cultural norms through law, provided that such 
promotion can be reconciled with the balance between religious, humanist and 
cultural elements that underpin the Union’s public morality and, in particular, its 
commitments to individual autonomy and equality which are reflected in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thus, the right of Member States to promote a 
                                                        
73 E. P. Foley, Liberty for All: Reclaiming Individual Privacy in a New Era of Public Morality,  (New 
Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2006). 
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particular way of life or view of the good life through law is, within certain 
boundaries, recognised by EU law. Indeed, as is shown below, the Union has 
repeatedly and explicitly recognised that notions of “morality”, “ordre public” and 
“public policy” as valid grounds for legislation.74 Given its explicit recognition as part 
of the Union’s constitutional values in the Lisbon Treaty and in the light of its heavy 
influence over national cultures and views of morality, religion plays an important 
part of these notions of public policy and morality. Thus, while the public morality is 
not explicitly or exclusively religious, as Davies notes, in relation to issues such as 
sexual morality, bio-ethics, gambling, or alcohol consumption, people’s views:   
“do derive directly or indirectly –via modern secular philosophies that 
have been influenced by religion – from religious values that pervade 
societies.”75  
Thus, he argues that morality clauses in trade law both “have a clear and traditional 
link with conventional interpretations of major religions”76 and facilitate the recognition of 
such religious perspectives in trade agreements. The same is true of the morality 
clauses in EU law which enable Member States, notwithstanding their EU law duties, 
to promote particular communal cultural or religious norms. For instance, in 
assessing the compatibility with EU law of Member State restrictions on gambling in 
the Schindler case, the Court of Justice stated that it was “not possible to disregard the 
moral, religious or cultural aspects of lotteries, like other types of gambling in Member 
States”77 which were held to grant the Member State in question a “degree of latitude” 
entitling it to restrict gambling notwithstanding the EU law duty to respect the 
freedom to provide services.78  The Treaty also makes room for Member States to 
derogate from EU legal duties in order to promote certain communal cultural, 
religious or moral norms. Articles 30 and 55 recognise “public morality”79 and “public 
                                                        
74 See below. 
75 G. Davies “Morality Clauses and Decision Making in Situations of Scientific Uncertainty: the 
Case of GMOs”, World Trade Review (2007), 6:2, 249-263. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v Schindler Case C-275/92 ECR [1994] I-01039. paragraph 60. 
78 Ibid. para. 61. 
79 Article 30 provides that: “The provisions of Articles 28 and 29 shall not preclude prohibitions or 
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the 
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the 
protection of industrial and commercial 
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policy”80 as legitimate grounds for the derogation from the duty of Member States to 
permit the free movement of goods and services. 
Not only is religion recognised, as a basis for derogation from EU law duties, it is 
also a valid element of EU legislation itself. Community legislation repeatedly refers 
to notions of ordre public or morality. In Netherlands v Council81Advocate General 
Jacobs cited several examples of the recognition of notions of morality in EU 
legislation noting that:  
“The Community Trade Mark Regulation82 and the Trade Marks 
Directive83 both provide for the refusal of registration or invalidity of a 
mark which is contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of 
morality (contraire à l'ordre public ou aux bonnes moeurs).84 The 
Community Plant Variety Rights Regulation85 provides that there is an 
impediment to the designation of a variety denomination where it is 
liable to give offence in one of the Member States or is contrary to 
public policy (est susceptible de contrevenir aux bonnes moeurs dans 
un des États membres ou est contraire à l'ordre public).86 Directive 
98/71 on the legal protection of designs87 provides that a design right 
shall not subsist in a design which is contrary to public policy or to 
accepted principles of morality (contraire à l'ordre public ou à la 
moralité publique).88 The amended proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Directive approximating the legal 
arrangements for the protection of inventions by utility model89 
provides that utility models shall not be granted in respect of 
inventions the exploitation of which would be contrary to public policy 
or morality (contraire à l'ordre public ou aux bonnes moeurs).”90 
                                                                                                                                                               
property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.”, Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community OJ C321, Article 30. 
80 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community OJ C321, Article 55. 
81 Netherlands v Council Case C-377/98 [2001] ECR I-7079. 
82 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark, OJ 
1994 L 11, p. 1. 
83 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the 
Member States relating to trade marks, OJ 1989 L 40, p. 1. 
84 Article 7(1)(f) of the Regulation and Article 3(1)(f) of the Directive. It may be noted that in his 
Opinion delivered on 23 January 2001 in Case C-299/99 Philips Electronics, at paragraph 18, 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer gave as an example of a trade mark registration of which 
would be barred because it was contrary to public policy the mark Babykiller for a 
pharmaceutical abortifacient. 
85 OJ 1994 L 227, p. 1 
86 Article 63(3)(e). 
87 Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998, OJ 1998 
L 289, p. 28. 
88 Article 8. 
89 OJ 2000 C 248E, p. 56. 
90 Article 4(a). 
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Thus, “public morality” and therefore religion, is well recognised as a permissible 
basis for legal and policy choices in Community law and as a permissible basis for 
Member States to derogate from the EU law duties. Individual autonomy is an 
important principle in the EU legal order and the Union requires that the 
accommodation of religious influence over law, and the promotion of communal 
moral standards which this may involve, not be such as to unduly curtail such 
autonomy.91 Nevertheless, as the acceptance of restrictions on gambling in Schindler 
on the basis of its particular “moral, religious or cultural aspects” shows, the Court 
accepts that EU law does, in certain circumstances, permit such moral notions to be 
invoked to restrict the autonomy of individuals to engage in activities regarded as 
damaging or sinful for cultural or religious reasons in order to allow Member States 
to promote their own collective vision of the good life and morality. Thus, although 
the Union has consistently required that the autonomy of public sphere institutions 
to legislate for that which contravenes religious morality be respected,92 it does 
permit some restriction of individual autonomy in the private sphere on religious 
grounds.  
EU public morality is also inherently pluralist in that it encompasses both a shared 
European, and differing national, ethical frameworks. This pluralism is further 
reflected in the Union’s acceptance that most ethical choices are to be taken at 
national level and upheld as part of EU law provided they are compatible within the 
broad parameters of an independent European public morality.93 These aspects of EU 
public morality were seen in the Schindler case where the Court of Justice recognised 
that particular national religious and cultural notions of morality in relation to 
gambling were a valid basis for the restriction of the freedom to provide gambling 
services.94 This focus on the recognition within EU law of the individual public 
moralities of the Member States and the consequent prioritisation of Member State 
                                                        
91 n.36 above 
92 Ibid.  
93 For a discussion of constitutional pluralism and the development of heterarchic rather than 
hierarchical interaction of legal orders see N. Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” EUI 
Working Papers, Law 2002/1 http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/179/1/law02-1.pdf 
(last visited 31 July 2008).  
94 n. 78 above. 
The Recognition of Religion 
 
 
28 
ethical choices is shown even more markedly in cases such as Grogan95 and Jany.96 In 
these cases the Court of Justice was faced with differing Member State regulation of 
the morally and religiously sensitive issues of abortion and prostitution. In Grogan 
the Court was faced with a situation where the combination of the differing moral 
judgments of Ireland and other Member States in relation to abortion and the EU law 
principle of free movement of services, threatened to undermine the ability of the 
Irish authorities to give effect to that moral judgment in a domestic context. In this 
case student groups facing prosecution for distributing information in relation to 
abortion services abroad in violation of the Irish Constitution’s protection of the life 
of the unborn, argued that such restrictions violated the freedom to provide services 
under EU law. The Court found that the lack of commercial links between the 
student organisations and the abortion providers in question precluded the 
invocation of Community law. Nevertheless, its judgment threw significant light on 
the pluralistic nature of public morality within EU law. The Society for the Protection 
of Unborn Children (“SPUC”) had argued that abortion should not be recognised as 
a service under EU law on grounds of what they saw as its grossly immoral nature. 
The Court’s decision on this point was as follows: 
“Whatever the merits of those arguments on the moral plane, they 
cannot influence the answer to the national court's first question. It is 
not for the Court to substitute its assessment for that of the legislature 
in those Member States where the activities in question are practised 
legally.”97 
The Court therefore explicitly refused to come to a “one size fits all” conclusion in 
relation to the morality of abortion in EU law and stated that it would not second 
guess the decision of the legislatures of Member State which had decided that 
abortion was legally acceptable. On the other hand, although its decision in relation 
to the lack of commercial links meant that the Court did not address the issue of the 
curtailment of the freedom to provide services on the basis of the differing moral 
choice of the Irish authorities, this issue was dealt with by Advocate General Van 
Gerven in his opinion. Having concluded that the provision of information in 
                                                        
95 Case C-159/90 SPUC v. Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685. 
96 Case C-268/99 Jany and Others  v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615. 
97 n. 95 above, paragraphs 19 and 20. 
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relation to abortion services in other Member States was covered by the principle of 
free movement of services, he held that restriction of such information was 
permissible on the basis that Ireland’s anti-abortion laws represented “a policy choice 
of a moral and philosophical nature the assessment of which is a matter for the Member States 
and in respect of which they are entitled to invoke the ground of public policy.”98 As this 
moral choice in relation to abortion was, in the view of the Member State, “a 
genuinely and sufficiently serious threat public policy affecting one of the fundamental 
interests of society”99 and in the light of “the area of discretion within the limits imposed by 
the Treaty”100 which Community law provided the national authorities, Advocate 
General Van Gerven was prepared to uphold the restriction in question as a 
proportionate derogation from the free movement of services on grounds of public 
policy.101  
Thus, in deciding what would qualify as a service for the purposes of EU law, the 
Court indicated that it would respect the moral pluralism of the Union by refusing to 
second guess the decision of those Member States for whom abortion was acceptable. 
On the other hand, in relation to the impact the decision of certain Member States to 
tolerate abortion and its consequent recognition as a service under Community law, 
could have on the enforcement within Ireland of anti-abortion laws, EU law, 
according to Advocate General Van Gerven, was equally willing to recognise a 
public morality derogation by the Irish authorities from freedom of movement of 
services in order to uphold Ireland’s different moral conclusions in relation to this 
issue. 
A similar commitment to the value of pluralism and a consequent desire to enable 
the notion of public morality within Community law to accommodate differing 
moral perspectives of Member States, was seen in Jany where the Court assessed 
whether prostitution could be categorised as a service under Community law and 
again based its affirmative decision on the basis that:  
                                                        
98 n. 95 above, Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, para. 26. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid.para. 29. 
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“So far as concerns [sic] the question of the immorality of that activity, 
raised by the referring court, it must be borne in mind that, as the 
Court has already held, it is not for the Court to substitute its own 
assessment for that of the legislatures of the Member States where an 
allegedly immoral activity is practised legally”.102 
The approach of the Court in Grogan and Jany underlines the importance of pluralism 
in the public morality of the EU. In both cases the Court stressed that the primary 
forum within which the ethical choices which influence the content of the public 
morality recognised and operationalised within EU law, is the individual Member 
States which are permitted to come to differing moral conclusions in relation to 
issues and to have these differing conclusions reflected in EU law. The deference to 
Member State ethical and cultural choices inherent in this endorsement of pluralism 
was further noted by the French Conseil constitutionnel  in its 2004 decision in relation 
to the constitutionality of the Constitutional Treaty where, in discussing the 
compatibility of the French approach to secularism with EU human rights norms, in 
it noted the “considerable leeway” granted to Member States “to define the most 
appropriate measures, taking into account their national traditions”.103 
However, the commitment to pluralism cuts both ways. Just as EU law is required to 
respect the principle of pluralism by accommodating divergent Member State moral 
choices, the moral choices of Member States themselves must respect the moral 
pluralism inherent in the notion of free movement guaranteed by Community law. 
Free movement rights enable individuals to place themselves under differing ethical 
regimes and therefore permit them to carry out activities which may be prohibited 
for reasons of public morality in their home country. EU law requires that Member 
State laws which reflect particular moral choices must be compatible with the right of 
individuals to choose, by means of free movement rights, to be bound by the moral 
choices of other Member States. Such a right can contribute significantly to 
individual autonomy by enabling, for example, those who wish to provide or use the 
services of prostitutes, to do so in another Member State despite the prohibition on 
doing so in their own country. The right to move across European borders is a 
                                                        
102 n. 96 above, para. 56.   
103 Decision n° 2004-505 DC of November 19th 2004, The Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2004/2004505/eng.htm, paragraph 18. 
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fundamental right under EU law whose violation is particularly likely to be 
characterised as disproportionate. The requirement of respect for the moral pluralism 
engendered by free movement rights can therefore be said to be a feature of the 
European element of the EU’s public morality. Thus, the plural nature of EU public 
morality which finds its expression in the reflection of Member State moral choices in 
EU law is itself restricted by the requirement of respect for the moral pluralism 
inherent in the free movement rights guaranteed by the Union.  
This requirement that Member State public morality take account of this right of 
individuals to access different ethical regimes in other Member States was seen in 
Advocate General Van Gerven’s opinion in Grogan where, as noted above, he 
suggested that, while measures restricting abortion information were acceptable 
within EU law:  
“a ban on pregnant women going abroad or a rule under which they 
would be subjected to unsolicited examinations upon their return from 
abroad” (…) would be disproportionate [and] would excessively 
impede the freedom to provide services.”104 
Similarly, in R. v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood,105 the 
UK Court of Appeal found, in a judgment which explicitly referred to the opinion in 
Grogan, that, in principle, EU law gives the right to receive medical treatment in 
another Member State and that moral choices in national law must take account of 
this right. In this case, a widow who was prevented from using her husband’s sperm 
for the purposes of artificial insemination due to a requirement in British legislation 
that he have given his written consent for its use, sought the right to bring the sperm 
to Belgium which had no such requirement. The Court of Appeal held that the 
medical treatment in question was insemination with her husband’s sperm rather 
than insemination in general and consequently a refusal to permit the export of his 
sperm amounted to an interference with her EU law rights.106 The judgment noted 
that, as the Court of Justice had held in Schindler, Member States had “a sufficient 
degree of latitude to determine the moral or religious or ethical values which it regards as 
                                                        
104 n. 98 above, para. 29.  
105 [1997] 2 All ER 687. 
106 Ibid. 698-700. 
The Recognition of Religion 
 
 
32 
appropriate in its territory“.107 Thus, provided that the interference in question was 
proportionate and justified by “some imperative requirement in the public interest” EU 
law could “not be relied upon as preventing [the British authorities] from imposing any 
restriction on the export of sperm”.108 However, the UK’s Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, which had taken the decision to refuse had a degree of 
discretion under the relevant legislation and, in coming to its decision, it was obliged 
to “balance Mrs Blood’s cross border rights as a Community citizen” against the United 
Kingdom’s ethical decision to “attach great importance to consent, the quality of that 
consent and the certainty of it”.109  Although the Court of Appeal was clear that it was 
“not possible to say, even taking into account E.C. law that the authority are bound to come 
to a decision in Mrs Blood’s favour” the failure to take her Community law rights into 
account and to “provide reasons which meet the standards set by European law”110 led to 
the quashing of the decision to prevent export.111 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal 
recognised that the right of EU citizens to travel between Member States in order to 
be bound by the differing ethical choices of another Member State must be taken into 
account in relation to the implementation of British public morality based policies. 
The United Kingdom authorities were therefore required to respect the pluralism 
inherent in the Single Market by countenancing the removal of sperm from the UK in 
order that it be used according to Belgian norms for purposes which the British 
authorities had held to be illegal on moral grounds.  
This notion of respect for the moral pluralism inherent in the notion of free 
movement and access for individuals to the differing ethical regimes of the Member 
States is also seen in cases such as Jany where, as noted above, the Court held that as 
the status of prostitution was legal under Dutch law this prevented the invocation of 
public morality as a reason to refuse the registration of Polish prostitutes as “self-
employed” for the purposes of the Pre-Accession Agreement. Issues of discrimination 
on grounds of nationality were obviously also an important factor in the decision, 
                                                        
107 Ibid. 700. 
108 Ibid. 701. 
109 Ibid. 702. 
110 Ibid. 703. 
111 Ibid.  
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nevertheless, by ensuring that non-nationals could not be subjected to more rigorous 
standards than those imposed on nationals, the ruling also underlines the right of 
individuals under EU law to access, by means of free movement, the opportunity to 
be bound by the ethical decisions of another Member State.  
The judgment in Blood, where the issue of moving between ethical frameworks was 
complicated by the impact on domestic moral choices of the issue of the export of 
sperm, made it clear that the right to access services in another Member State may 
not always override the right of individual Member States to enforce collective moral 
preferences. Nevertheless, Advocate General Van Gerven’s statement in Grogan that 
attempts to prevent pregnant women from travelling to other Member States to have 
abortions would be unacceptable under EU law despite what he recognised as the 
grave importance of the moral principle which such a ban would be seeking to 
uphold,112 indicates that the right to move between Member States is taken extremely 
seriously by EU law and represents a real limitation on the ability of Member States 
to legislate so as to enforce particular moral, religious or cultural norms. Thus, the 
reflection by a particular Member State of communal religious norms in its 
legislation is required by EU law to take account of the overall pluralism inherent in 
the European project which has opened up ethical horizons beyond the nation state 
to individual Europeans, thereby limiting the degree to which the such communal 
moral norms can be imposed on individuals who, in Hirschman’s terms113 have the 
right of exit in addition to the voice with which domestic democratic structures 
provide them. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
112 n. 98 above. 
113 A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1970). 
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5. Limitations on Public Morality within EU Law 
However, to suggest that this pluralism is such as to exclude any independent moral 
judgment of Member State public morality derogations at the European level is 
mistaken. EU public morality is both national and European, and the requirements of 
this independent, European element of EU public morality can be such as to provide 
limitations on the reflection of Member State moral choices. Becoming and remaining 
a Member State of the European Union involves moral commitments to certain 
notions of the good beyond respect for pluralism. These notions have been linked by 
the Union to respect for fundamental rights and democracy. At least as a matter of 
politics, this duty applies to Member States even when they act outside of the 
Union’s areas of competence. The 1993 Copenhagen Criteria explicitly established 
respect for fundamental rights as an explicit criterion for membership of the Union.114 
The Nice and Lisbon Treaties also stated that the Member States :    
“their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law”115 
and laid down respect for such principles as an ongoing duty of membership 
through Article 7 which envisaged the removal of voting rights from Member States 
which is in “serious and persistent breach” of this obligation.116 Furthermore, the 
adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has committed both the Union and 
the Member States to upholding, within the sphere of operation of EU law, a certain 
view of the good, albeit one which preserves a significant degree of latitude for 
Member States. This view does, however, encompass certain principles such as 
privacy and equality which embody notions of the good which would preclude 
attempts to enshrine in law certain moral or religious notions inconsistent with such 
principles. 
                                                        
114 European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 
180/1/93 REV 1. Available at 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921.pdf (last visited 20 June 2008). 
115 n.12 above, Preamble to the Consolidated Treaty on European Union. See also the Preamble to 
the Treaty on the functioning on the European Union. (also n.12 above). 
116 Article 7 TEU as amended (see n. 12 above). 
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These duties have been used as a basis to restrict the ability of Applicant States and 
Member States to use their legal systems to reflect religious and moral perspectives 
in a way which is inconsistent with notions of equality and individual autonomy, 
even in areas which lie outside of the scope of the Treaties. Romania and Turkey 
were required by the Union not to criminalise homosexuality and adultery 
respectively as conditions of membership,117 while in 2005 Poland’s newly elected 
conservative government was warned by the Commission that it risked losing voting 
rights in EU institutions if it failed to respect gay rights.118  
These obligations are not merely political and the European element of EU public 
morality can act as a legal limitation on the accommodation of Member State moral 
choices in EU law. Contrary to some readings of the judgments in Grogan and Jany,119 
the Court’s conclusion that “arguments on the moral plane cannot influence the answer” 
in relation to the status of abortion of prostitution as a service does not mean that EU 
law is merely a passive reflector of Member State public moralities. In addition to the 
political and legal commitments to fundamental rights, EU legislation includes 
numerous morality clauses such as those noted by Advocate General Jacobs above in 
Netherlands v Council. Not all of these clauses deal with the issue of Member State 
derogations on morality grounds but also refer to the notion of public morality 
within EU law, independent of the status of such notions at Member State level. 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer gave an example of the operation of the 
notion of morality within Community law in the Phillips Electronics120 case where he 
suggested by way of example that the registration of an abortifacient under the trade 
mark “Babykiller” would be barred under Community law on the grounds that to do 
so would be contrary to public policy.121  
                                                        
117 n. 36 above. 
118 Ibid. 
119 D.R. Phelan 'The Right to Life of the Unborn v the Promotion of Trade in Services', (1992) 55 
MLR 670. 
120 Case C-299/99 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd. ECR 
[2002] I-05475. 
 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer. 
121 Ibid. para. 18 
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In relation to derogations from EU law on the basis of Member State moral choices, 
the Court has repeatedly made it clear that “concept of public policy cannot be 
unilaterally decided by each Member State without being subject to control by the institutions 
of the Community.”122  Thus, rather than demonstrating that EU law merely reflects 
and does not independently assess the moral nature of such derogations, cases such 
as Grogan merely show that such assessments take very seriously the need to respect 
the inherent pluralism of the EU’s public morality and also therefore, the autonomy 
of Member States in moral matters. This reading of Grogan is supported by the fact 
that the jurisprudence of the Court has made it clear that it will assess Member State 
moral choices for compliance with the Community moral norms which make up a 
European element of the Union’s public morality and may intervene when such 
moral choices are divergent to too great a degree from these Community moral 
norms. This Community morality, as will be shown below, is rather thin but does, in 
addition to the principle of pluralism discussed above, encompass to the notion of 
balance between religious, cultural and humanist elements reflected in requirements 
of respect for the idea of the individual as an autonomous and equal actor and for 
certain communal European norms, all of which are assessed in relation to the broad 
notion of the good reflected in the Union’s commitments to fundamental rights.  
 
5.1. Consistency with a Common Ethical Template 
The case law of the Court of Justice has also appeared to suggest that Member State 
derogations from EU norms on grounds of public morality will be accepted only 
where they in some way echo, or are congruent with, an independent set of EU 
moral norms. The limitation on Member State moral choices imposed in this regard 
requires that the moral choice in question fall within the broad definition of the good 
seen in the fundamental principles of EU law (most notably in relation to 
fundamental rights). 
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In Omega Spielhallen123 the Court explicitly looked to find echoes in the Union’s legal 
order for the moral value which the German authorities relied upon in order to 
prohibit a game which was alleged to contravene public morality. Here, the provider 
of a game which was alleged to allow players to simulate killing by shooting lasers at 
one another challenged the action of the German authorities who had prohibited the 
game on the grounds that it “was contrary to fundamental values prevailing in public 
opinion”,124 in particular the respect for human dignity required by the German 
Constitution. The Applicant alleged that the prohibition in question violated the 
freedom to provide services guaranteed by the EC Treaty. The German authorities 
argued that their actions were protected by the public policy and public morality  
exceptions recognised by EU law. 
In assessing the German derogation, the Court recognised that Member States had a 
margin of discretion in relation to the concept of public policy and that the restrictive 
measures in question did not need “to correspond to a conception shared by all Member 
States as regards the precise way in which the fundamental right or legitimate interest in 
question is to be protected.“125 Nevertheless, the Court explicitly assessed whether the 
fundamental value invoked by the Member State was also reflected in the 
autonomous values of the Community legal order. In paragraphs 34 and 35 it held 
that: 
“the Community legal order undeniably strives to ensure respect for 
human dignity as a general principle of law. There can therefore be no 
doubt that the objective of protecting human dignity is compatible 
with Community law, it being immaterial in that respect that, in 
Germany, the principle of respect for human dignity has a particular 
status as an independent fundamental right. 
Since both the Community and its Member-States are required to 
respect fundamental rights, the protection of those rights is a 
legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the 
obligations imposed by Community law,”126 
                                                        
123 Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609.  
124 Ibid. para. 7. 
125 Ibid. para. 37. 
126 Ibid. para. 34 and 35.  
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The conclusion that human dignity was a general principle of EU law was based on 
the analysis of  Advocate General Stix-Hackl who noted in her opinion that “a variety 
of religious, philosophical and ideological reasoning could be given as the basis of this 
analysis”127 before noting the recognition of the right in various international Human 
Rights treaties,128 Member State constitutions,129 Directives and Regulations130 and 
decisions of the Court of Justice.131 In other words, the accommodation within EU 
law of the German public morality exception in respect of the dignity of the human 
being, was dependent on the recognition of a similar moral value by the Community 
legal order, which, as the Court noted in paragraph 33 and in cases such as Hauer132 
draws on, but is independent of, the common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States. This is in line with Advocate General Stix-Hackl’s conclusion that the 
assessment of Member State derogations on grounds of public morality includes 
review of “appropriateness” in addition to proportionality.133 
The notion of assessing the “appropriateness” of such derogations would seem to 
imply that national moral judgments are to be assessed for their compatibility with 
an independent set of standards within EU law.  Indeed in the case of Netherlands v 
Council134 which involved a challenge, inter alia, on public morality grounds, to the 
1998 Biotechnology Directive, Advocate General Jacobs implied that the scope of 
common EU morality may evolve and come to cover an increasingly broad range of 
areas, arguing, in relation to Member State morality derogations in the area of 
biotechnology that:  
“the discretion of a Member State to determine the scope of the 
concept of public morality in accordance with its own scale of values, 
so defined by the Court more that 20 years ago, should perhaps now be 
read with some caution. In this area, as in many others, common 
standards evolve over the years. It may be that the ethical dimension 
                                                        
127 Ibid. Opinion of Advocate-General Stix-Hackl, paragraph 78. 
128 Ibid. para. 82. 
129 Ibid. para. 83. 
130 Ibid. para. 87. 
131 Ibid. paras. 88, 89 and 90. 
132 Judgment of 13/12/1979, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz (Rec.1979,p.3727). 
133 n. 127 above, para. 103. 
134 Netherlands v Council Case C-377/98 ]2001] ECR I-7079. 
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of some of the basic issues within the scope of the Directive is now 
more appropriately regarded as governed by common standards.”135 
The progressive embrace by the Union of shared fundamental values as an element 
of its identity and legal order may therefore be increasing the degree to which the 
that legal order reflects and upholds an independent framework of moral values. 
This potentially limits the pluralism of the EU’s public morality in that the 
emergence of common standards, on Advocate General Jacobs’ analysis, results in 
the restriction of the discretion of Member States to pursue approaches which differ 
from such standards.  
The development of the fundamental rights obligations of the Union have had a 
notable impact in this regard. In the ERT136 case  it was held that all Member State 
derogations from EU law duties (therefore including those based on public morality) 
are subject to compliance with the common commitment of all Members States of the 
Union to comply with fundamental rights obligations. Furthermore, given their 
fundamental status in the ethical and legal order of the Union, the fundamental 
rights recognised by EU law must have a major impact on the content of EU public 
morality as well as on the limitations imposed on the reflection of the particular 
public moralities of individual states within the Union’s legal order. This analysis is 
further underlined by  the fact that in Omega, the inquiry into the legitimacy of a 
derogation from the freedom to provide services on the basis of the need to protect 
human dignity was regarded by both the Court and Advocate General as 
conclusively resolved (although issues of proportionality remained outstanding) by 
the identification of this principle as one of the general principles of law protected by 
the Community legal order.137 In other words, once the protection of human dignity 
had been categorised as part of the general principles of law through which 
fundamental rights are protected within EU law, a derogation based thereon was in 
principle acceptable and no further identification of the source or broader 
significance of the relevant principle was required. 
                                                        
135 Ibid. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, para. 102. 
136 ERT Case C-260/89 ECR [1991] I-02925. 
 
137 n. 126 above. 
The Recognition of Religion 
 
 
40 
The reflection of Member State moral choices in the public morality of the EU is 
therefore dependent on the compatibility of such moral choices with the Union’s 
fundamental rights obligations and general principles of law, which are now given 
expression in the Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights which acts to “reaffirm” 
the fundamental rights resulting from the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States. As Foley has suggested, all constitutions depend on a failure to 
definitively resolve certain fraught issues and contain unwritten, tacit “abeyances” 
which enable such constitutions to survive by fulfilling the need for “protective 
obscurity” around certain issues.138 In line with this approach and in common with 
the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights does not explicitly identify 
itself with any particular religious worldview. Neither does it claim that the rights it 
contains derive from any particular religious tradition or divine authority. This, as 
Weiler notes,139 is in contrast to the constitutions of several EU Member States which, 
specifically invoke either God or the Christian Trinity or which recognise a particular 
religion as underpinning their constitutional order.140 However, the Charter does 
invoke Europe’s “spiritual and moral heritage”141 and undertakes to respect:  
“the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as 
well as the national identities of the Member States”142 
Thus, the rights contained in the Charter are seen as emerging from a particular 
religious and moral heritage which, as noted above, has been heavily marked by 
Christian and humanist influences. The interpretation of these rights is, therefore, 
likely to reflect and accommodate established European ways of life and to prove 
less challenging to the ambitions and public role of culturally entrenched religions or 
religions which can reconcile themselves to humanist influences than to religions 
which lack such characteristics. Indeed, the influence of humanist principles is 
clearly seen in the Preamble to the Charter which speaks of “universal values of human 
                                                        
138 M. Foley, The Silence of Constitutions, (London, Routledge, 1989) 81. 
139 n. 24 above. 
140 J.T.S. Madeley, “European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality” in 
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Neutrality (London, Frank Cass Publishing, 2003).  
141 n. 12 above, Preamble to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
142 Preamble, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007/C 303/01, 14.12.2007. 
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dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity” 143 and of the Union’s commitment to place “the 
individual at the heart of its activities”. 144 The importance of individual human as an 
equal and autonomous agent is also recognised in Articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 11 and 21 which 
protect the rights to bodily integrity, liberty of the person, freedom from slavery, 
privacy, freedom of expression equality.145 On the other hand, the Charter also 
recognises religion and religious freedom as another “good” while the Preamble and 
Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty specifically endorse the notion of at least some 
religious influence over law. Furthermore, the national cultures and identities which 
the Charter undertakes to respect may themselves involve the promotion of 
religiously influenced communal moral standards. Thus, the notion of the good with 
which Member State moral choices must be compatible is rather broad and offers 
significant scope for the maintenance of the pluralism of EU public morality. The 
Court of Justice has not identified any overarching worldview within which its 
general principles and defence of human rights are based and thus has not required 
the Member State public moralities fall in line with any such worldview. The ethical 
template which is laid down in the Charter does reflect the influence of the Christian 
and humanist traditions in Europe to some degree but is at the same time relatively 
broad and flexible and therefore gives Member States significant leeway to pursue 
their particular collective moral goals. 
 
5.2. The Importance of Balance   
Despite the relatively broad and flexible nature of the ethical template set out in the 
Charter, there are aspects of the Union’s approach, beyond which Member State 
autonomy in moral and religious matters can potentially be restricted to a significant 
degree. Indeed, the very pluralism that is the source of Member State autonomy in 
moral matters itself operates so as to restrict this autonomy. EU public morality is 
characterised by a commitment to balancing what are seen as the potentially 
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The Recognition of Religion 
 
 
42 
conflicting “goods” of Europe’s religious, humanist and cultural inheritance. EU law 
requires that Member States respect this element of European public morality and 
that, in seeking to promote their own versions of public morality, they respect this 
notion of balance and do not accord absolute priority to any single element. The 
notion of balance between conflicting goods has been a central concern of the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. In contrast to the almost absolutist approach 
adopted by US constitutional law, for example in relation to freedom of speech, EU 
law has tended to seek to balance conflicting rights. As noted above, MacCormick 
and others have noted how when faced with clashes of two “goods”146 the Court has 
not sought to establish a “hierarchical structure among these values” but has instead its 
decisions “are a matter of weighing and balancing”.147  
The Court has followed the same approach in relation to fundamental rights. In 
Promusciae the Court of Justice assessed the implementation of EU copyright 
legislation by Spain in the light of a request by an organisation representing the 
owners of intellectual property rights to an internet provider to disclose the identities 
of internet users who had violated such rights using filesharing software. It held that:  
“the Member States must, when transposing the directives mentioned 
above, take care to rely on an interpretation of the directives which 
allows fair balance to be struck between the various fundamental 
rights protected by the Community legal order. Further, when 
implementing the measures transposing those directives, the 
authorities and courts of the Member States must not only interpret 
their national law in a manner consistent with those directives but also 
make sure that they do not rely on an interpretation of them which 
would be in conflict with those fundamental rights or with other 
general principles of Community law such as the principle of 
proportionality.”148 (emphasis added). 
                                                        
146 J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice” in G. de Burca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.) The European 
Court of Justice, The Academy of European Law, European University Institute, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2001. In this instance the authours were discussing the clash between the goals of 
market freedoms and environmental protection. 
147 Ibid. 65. 
148 Case C-275/06 Promusicae v Telefónica de España SAU, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 29 January 2008, para. 68. 
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Thus, faced with a clash between the “goods” of privacy and property rights, the 
Court did not assign priority to one over the other but required that that the Member 
State in question strike a “fair balance” between them.  
McCormick et al. note that an approach centred on balancing reflects a “value 
pluralism” where “values and principles cannot be reduced to a single value or coherent set 
of values, nor should conflicts between reasons be interpreted as a sign of imperfection, but 
rather as the normal state for human beings.”149 The Court’s focus on notions of balance 
reflects the value pluralism of EU public morality in that it does not require uniform 
moral outcomes in each Member State but permits differing national conclusions in 
relation to moral issues provided that such conclusions respect the concept of “fair 
balance”. This concept grants Member States a considerable degree of latitude and 
thereby may grant a degree of what Foley would term “protective obscurity” to the EU 
legal order. On this view, EU law does not seek perfection or pursue a single 
outcome of the reconciliation of conflicting rights but embraces the notion of 
pragmatic reconciliation of rights rather than more doctrinaire according of priority 
to one set of rights over another. On the other hand this balance-centred approach 
does not give Member States an entirely free hand in that it also implies that certain 
approaches which, for example fail to give any or adequate weight to principles 
identified as “goods” by the Community legal order will fall foul of EU law.  
Given that, religion, the protection of national culture and identity and the rights to 
individual autonomy and equality (which can be threatened by the imposition of 
communal religious or cultural standards) have been identified as “goods” by 
Community law, Member States must ensure that the moral choices they make 
which impinge on these goods do not fail to respect the duty of maintaining balance 
between them. This commitment to a balance between religious, cultural and 
humanist influences is seen in EU anti-discrimination legislation which, attempts to 
balance the institutional rights of religious bodies and the cultural role of religious 
institutions in many Member States with the right of individuals to privacy and 
                                                        
149 n. 146 above, 64. 
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equal treatment.150 A concern that a failure to maintain such a balance between these 
elements could invite the intervention of EU law was seen in relation to the concerns 
in France that the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the 
Constitutional Treaty might, due to its commitments to religious freedom, 
compromise the France’s strictly secular approach to the wearing of religious 
clothing in schools. This was referred to by the Conseil constitutionnel in its decision 
on the Constitutional Treaty151 in which it held that the French approach to this issue 
was not imperilled by the Treaty. It came to this conclusion on the basis that the 
French approach was in fact characterised by a degree of balance between the 
competing goods of religion, the secular identity of the French state and the 
protection of individual rights inherent in this secularist approach. The Conseil held 
that the relevant French laws had “reconcile[d] the principle of freedom of religion and 
that of secularism”152 and that given that the Court of Human Rights had given 
individual states “considerable leeway to define the most appropriate measures, taking into 
account their national traditions”,153 the French approach was not endangered by the 
Constitutional Treaty’s recognition of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thus, the 
Conseil did not simply conclude that Member States had the sufficient cultural 
autonomy to define an approach to these issues without European interference but 
rather held that the French approach, in the light of both the considerable autonomy 
retained by Member States in this area and the fact that it balanced the relevant 
rights, would not trigger European intervention.   
 
 
                                                        
150 See Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation Article 2(5) OJ L 303, 2.12.2000. 
151 Decision n° 2004-505 DC of November 19th 2004, The Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe available at: http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2004/2004505/eng.htm 
(last visited 20 June 2008). 
 
152 Ibid. para. 18. 
153 Ibid. 
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5.3. Fair Balance and the Autonomy and Equality of the Individual 
Although an approach which leaves it to Member States to strike a fair balance 
between rights does grant significant leeway to national authorities, the notion of 
what is “fair” is influenced by certain fundamental shared European norms which 
restrict Member State autonomy in this area.  Legislation, on the part of either the 
Union or it Member States, which seeks to promote notions of public morality, is 
required to respect certain key principles such as coherence, proportionality and 
non-discrimination which is centred on the strong tradition of individual liberty 
within Western liberal thought. Thus, while a margin of discretion in relation to 
public policy is provided by the willingness of the Courts to permit public policy 
derogations to be assessed “in accordance with [a Member State’s] own scale of values and 
in the form selected by it,”154 the Court has repeatedly affirmed that, as Advocate 
General Van Gerven stated in Grogan this margin of discretion is subject to “the limits 
set by Community law” which includes a proportionality test requiring that the 
derogation: 
“be justified by some imperative requirement in the general interest, 
(...) be suitable for securing the attainment of the objects which it 
pursues and (…) must not go beyond what is necessary to attain that 
objective.”155   
Member State morality based derogations which are held by the Court to interfere in 
a disproportionate way with Community law rights will, therefore, not be accepted 
in EU law. Advocate General Van Gerven, for example, suggested in Grogan that a 
ban on pregnant women travelling or mandatory pregnancy tests on women on 
departure from or return to Ireland would fail this test.156  
The Court has also been clear that derogations on grounds of the need to promote 
public morality must also respect the principle of non-discrimination between 
nationals and citizens of other Member States. In both Jany157 and Adoui and 
                                                        
154 Case 121/85 Conegate Limited v. HM Customs and Excise ECR [1986] 01007. 
155 As summarised in Blood, n. 105 above, 700. 
156 n. 98 above, para. 29. 
157 Case C-268/99 Jany and Others  v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2001] ECR I-8615. 
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Cornouaille158 the Court refused to accept attempts to curtail, on grounds of public 
morality, the Community law rights of non-national prostitutes to work in Member 
States on the basis that: 
“Although Community law does not impose on Member States a 
uniform scale of values as regards the assessment of conduct which 
may be considered to be contrary to public policy, conduct may not be 
considered to be of a sufficiently serious nature to justify restrictions 
on entry to, or residence within, the territory of a Member State of a 
national of another Member State where the former Member State 
does not adopt, with respect to the same conduct on the part of its own 
nationals, repressive measures or other genuine and effective 
measures intended to combat such conduct”159 
As discussed above, this principle is also linked to the moral pluralism inherent in 
the European project which confers on those individuals with the abilities, resources 
and skills to do so, the right to choose, by exercising freedom of movement, to be 
bound by the ethical choices of different Member States. In addition, it is connected 
to the broader requirement that Member State derogations be coherent and internally 
consistent in order to achieve acceptance within EU law. This was seen most notably 
in the Conegate160 case where a challenge was brought to the refusal of the British 
authorities to permit the import of certain pornographic items on the basis that 
domestic law permitted their domestic manufacture and sale (subject to a ban on 
sending them through the post). The Court upheld the challenge on the basis that: 
“A Member State may not rely on grounds of public morality in order 
to prohibit the importation of goods from other Member States when 
its legislation contains no prohibition on the manufacture or 
marketing of the same goods on its territory”161 
It further stated that:  
“It must at least be possible to conclude from the applicable rules, 
taken as a whole that their purpose is, in substance, to prohibit the 
manufacture and marketing of those products”162 
                                                        
158 Joined Cases 115 and 116/81 Adoui and Cornouaille v. Belgian State ECR [1982] 01665. 
159 Ibid. para. 60. 
160 n. 154 above. 
161 Ibid. para. 16. 
162 Ibid. para. 17. 
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The decision in Conegate clearly has much in common with the approach adopted in 
Jany and Adoui and Cornouaille which precluded the imposition of stricter moral 
standards on outsiders than a Member State’s own nationals. However, as the above 
paragraph shows, it also underlines a second aspect of the approach of EU law to 
public morality in that the Court also made it clear that Member State derogations on 
grounds of public morality would also be assessed for their internal coherence and 
that measures which fail to indicate the requisite degree of coherence would not be 
accepted in EU law. The importance attached by the Court to the coherence of 
Member State morality derogations reflects Fuller’s notion of the “internal morality” 
of law which requires that laws be sufficiently general, intelligible and free of 
contradictions.163 As MacCormick and others have pointed out, the notion of 
coherence has been an important element in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
and derives from “the idea crucial to the rule of law that the different parts of the whole 
legal order should hang together and make sense as a whole,”164 or, at the very least, should 
not actively contradict each other. Such ideas are central to the principle of the rule of 
law which the Union has explicitly embraced as part of the Copenhagen Criteria 
setting out the prerequisites of membership165 and as one of the EU’s fundamental 
constitutional values which finds expression in general terms in the Preamble to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights166 as well as more concrete expression in the 
prohibition of retroactive or extra legal punishment in Article 49.1.167  
These requirements establish a broad framework which is centred on individual 
liberty. The Union’s approach implicitly distinguishes between law and morality, 
                                                        
163 L. Fuller The Morality of Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1969). 
164 J. Bengoetxea, N. MacCormick and L. Moral Soriano, “Integration and Integrity in the Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice” in G. de Burca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.) The European 
Court of Justice, The Academy of European Law, European University Institute, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2001, 47. 
165 The Copenhagen Criteria provide that: "Membership requires that candidate country has 
achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and, protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well 
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union “See: 
European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993, Conclusions of the Presidency, SN 180/1/93 
REV 1. Available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72921.pdf (last 
visited 20 June 2008). 
166 Preamble, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007/C 303/01, 14.12.2007. 
167 Article 49.1, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007/C 303/01, 
14.12.2007. 
The Recognition of Religion 
 
 
48 
regards individual freedom to act as the default position and requires that all 
curtailments of such freedom be coherent and as narrowly tailored as possible. These 
notions of the centrality of individual autonomy and the view of morality as a largely 
private matter whose enforcement by law must be limited and specifically justified 
have a long history in Western liberal thought but have been less influential in other 
contexts, most notably in largely Muslim societies.168 Combined with the emphasis 
placed on non-discrimination in Jany, Conegate and Adoui, the requirements of 
coherence and proportionality underline the importance placed by the EU legal 
order of the individual as an equal and autonomous actor whose ability to take 
decisions and plan his or her own life must be respected. Thus, the promotion of 
public morality by law takes place in a context which places significant emphasis on 
individual liberty against which the promotion of communal moral standards must 
be balanced and which may therefore prove less challenging for religions which have 
reconciled themselves to the emphasis placed on human autonomy within Western 
societies. 
 
5.4. Public Morality and Perspectives Contrary to Common European 
Norms  
The importance attached to individual autonomy by EU law can be seen as merely 
indicative of a wider point, namely, that certain norms, which for cultural and 
historical reasons have come to be widely shared in Europe influence the kind of 
moral goals which can validly be pursued by legislative means under EU law. As 
both Advocate General Jacobs’ point in relation to the restriction of Member State 
autonomy in moral matters through the emergence of common European 
standards,169 and the notion of assessing the “appropriateness” of the moral goal 
                                                        
168 See T. Gabriel “Is Islam against the West?” in R. Geaves, T. Gabriel, Y. Haddad and J. Idleman 
Smith (eds.)  Islam and the West Post 9/11 (Aldershot, Hants, England, Ashgate, 2004) at 15). See 
also See also P. Norris and R. Inglehart Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
169 n. 135 above. 
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pursued by the Member State in question in Omega,170 suggest, certain moral goals 
which run counter to the notion of the good reflected in the Charter which, as noted 
above, is broad but nevertheless influenced by common European inheritance of 
Christian, humanist and cultural influences, are seen as illegitimate and unacceptable 
within EU law, even if balanced against other countervailing influences.  
To take an example, the emergence of a common European norm of gender equality 
may operate so as to reduce the ability of Member States to make differing moral 
choices in this area. For instance, Article 41.2 of the Irish constitution provides that 
“1. In particular, the State recognises that by her life within the home, 
woman gives to the State a support without which the common good 
cannot be achieved.  
2. The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall 
not be obliged by economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect 
of their duties in the home.”171 
This article could be seen as representing a deeply held religiously influenced moral 
notion in relation to the upholding of differences between the sexes and the role of 
women and mothers in family life. Should the Irish authorities introduce legislation 
which discouraged mothers of young children from taking paid employment, such 
measures would fall foul of the principle of gender equality in the workplace 
enshrined in EU law. Even if the Irish government were to demonstrate that the 
measure in question was very limited and attempted to balance the rights of 
individuals to equal treatment against the religious and moral imperative to 
maintain traditional gender roles, it is difficult to imagine that such a choice could be 
categorised as, to use the language of Advocate General Stix-Hackl in Omega, 
“appropriate” by the Court in the light of the emphasis placed by Community law on 
gender equality in the workplace and the principle of equal treatment in general. 
Indeed, in Kreil the Court was willing to interfere with an explicit constitutional 
mandate in the extremely sensitive area of military policy when the policy in 
question violated the norm of gender equality.172 On the other hand, where common 
                                                        
170 n. 127 above. 
171 Bunreacht na h-Éireann (The Constitution of Ireland), Articles 41.2.1 and 41.2.2. 
172 Case C-285/98 Kreil  v. Germany [2000] ECR I-69. 
The Recognition of Religion 
 
 
50 
standards have not yet emerged to the same degree, as for example is the case in 
relation to sexual orientation discrimination, compromises on the principle of equal 
treatment on the basis of respect for religious and cultural norms have been accepted 
by EU law, most notably in relation to the Framework Directive which has explicitly 
permitted discrimination in employment on grounds of sexual orientation in 
organisations which have a religious ethos on the ground that the limited 
exemptions achieved a balance between the rights of religious bodies and those of 
individuals.173  
Notions of religious morality which deviate from established European cultural 
norms are, of course, more likely to come into conflict with “common standards.” 
Thus, notions of European public morality are, to a degree linked to the promotion of 
a common European way of life or ways of life which are respectful of the balance 
between largely Christian religious and humanist influences which characterise 
European history, in addition to cultural norms, in relation, for instance, to gender 
equality which have emerged from this history. Therefore, common European norms 
around the mixing of the genders may prevent the recognition on public morality 
grounds of a Member State law which sought to enforce in the workplace Islamic 
notions of the separation of the genders. Similarly, it is interesting to consider how 
the Court of Justice would react to notions of morality deriving from religions such 
as Scientology which have little cultural purchase in Europe. A law passed by a 
Member State at the instigation of Scientologists which for instance, banned the 
practice of psychiatry (towards which the Church of Scientology is very hostile) and 
placed the kind of restrictions on the advertising of psychiatric services which 
Ireland had placed on abortion services in Grogan would present the Court of Justice 
with the prospect of recognising as part of European public morality a moral stance 
rejected by the overwhelming majority of Europeans.  
Were such laws passed by the Union’s own legislature there is, I would suggest, little 
likelihood that they would survive review by the Court. However, the pluralism of 
the EU’s public morality means that when Member States seek to make such choices, 
                                                        
173 R. (Amicus and others) v. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 860.  
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difficulties arise. The Union’s commitment to certain values means that it must place 
some limits on what can be accepted as part of the public morality recognised by EU 
law. Notions of proportionality, coherence and a duty to respect rights to move 
between countries do provide some such limits. However, the judgment in Omega 
and the importance placed by the Union on compliance with fundamental rights, 
particularly in the ERT judgment, means that certain religious and moral viewpoints 
which contradict the balance between religion and humanism inherent in the Union’s 
public morality (seen particularly in its fundamental rights instruments) may simply 
not be capable of being accommodated by European public morality or, therefore, 
EU law. Indeed, such an approach is arguably implicit in Articles 6 and 7 TEU which 
require Member States to uphold human rights and democracy on pain of loss of 
voting rights in the Council and thereby stress the notion of EU membership as 
involving a commitment to a certain shared European notion of the good. 
Therefore, if the Union is to be a “Community of Values” and it commitments to 
fundamental rights and shared norms are to have any meaning, certain moral or 
religious goals which deviate from established European cultural norms or common 
standards will not be capable of being accommodated within EU public morality and 
will be held to be contrary to European public morality even before issues of balance 
or coherence arise. On this view, particular historical and cultural experiences such 
as Europe’s collective guilt in relation to the holocaust or its long experience of 
Christianity and humanism will influence the Union’s view of what can “count” as 
valid religious or cultural aims in the striking of a balance between religious cultural 
and humanist influences. From such a viewpoint, when the Court of Justice, as it did 
in Omega, investigates the appropriateness of a moral choice which a Member State is 
seeking to have recognised within EU law, or when the special contribution of 
religious bodies to policy formation is being sought by EU institutions, all forms of 
religious morality may for cultural, historic, moral or other reasons, not “count” in 
striking a fair balance between religious influences and humanist influenced notions 
of individual autonomy. Rather, as in Promusicae , the Court will assess the balance, 
only in relation to forms of religion whose influence can be balanced against 
humanist influences or established European cultural norms. Approaches which, like 
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radical Islam, are radically opposed to key influences such as humanism or which 
by, promoting racist ideas, clash with the legacy of key cultural and historical 
experiences such as the holocaust simply will not be recognised for the purposes of 
such balancing exercises.  
Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, the reflection of religion in EU law by means of 
the recognition of public morality, is likely to favour those forms of religion which 
can reconcile themselves to the balance between religious and humanist influences 
which has emerged from European history and which characterises much of 
European culture. As Taylor and Le Goff have pointed out, humanism’s success in 
Europe occurred partly because of the humanistic elements of Europe’s historically 
dominant religion, Christian religions. Many have suggested that many of the 
fundamental values of the Union such as democracy equality and individual 
autonomy have roots in Christianity.174 Thus, it is not unreasonable to conclude 
therefore that given its enormous cultural influence and its links to humanism, 
Christianity may exercise a greater influence over European public morality (and 
thereby EU law) than other faiths. Nevertheless, the humanist influences over 
European culture which gave rise to the secularisation of Europe, have, despite the 
religious roots they may have had, have served to limit religious influence over law 
and politics. This has been particularly true in relation to what Casanova termed 
“lifeworld” issues of family, sexuality and the beginning and end of life in relation to 
which mainstream Christian denominations have continued to attempt to influence 
law so that it conforms to their moral teachings. Thus, even if liberal notions such as 
autonomy and equality can be seen as the offspring of Christianity, they represent 
rather rebellious offspring which, as adults, have come to clash with their “parents” 
in the legal and political arenas. The Union’s commitment to balancing religious and 
humanist influences therefore restricts all religions, including those with deep roots 
in national and European culture. 
 
                                                        
174 See for example G. Weigel The Cube and the Cathedral: Europe, America and Politics without 
God (New York, Basic Books, 2005). 
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6. Conclusion 
The notions of pluralism, balance and inheritance are key features of the recognition 
of religion as a basis of law in the EU constitutional order. The legitimacy of religious 
input into law is recognised at a symbolic level through the recognition of religion as 
an element of the Union’s constitutional values, at an institutional level in the 
recognition of religious bodies in the lawmaking process and in substantive law 
through the recognition of religion as part of a public morality which the Union and 
Member States may legislate to protect.  
However, in all three areas in which religion is recognised it must share its role as an 
element of public morality with cultural and humanist influences which are similarly 
recognised. Although these elements can reinforce each other (as in the case of the 
Christian influence on Member State cultures) they can also be in conflict (as when 
humanism’s stress on individual autonomy clashes with religious desires to promote 
communal morality). Thus, the overall public morality through which religion 
influences EU law is characterised by a balance between these religious, cultural and 
humanist elements. These features are seen in relation to religion’s institutional 
position where the recognition of the special importance and contribution of 
religious institutions to lawmaking is balanced by the secularising effect of providing 
such recognition in the context of a pluralist civil society.  
In relation to substantive EU law, religion exercises influence by means of morality 
clauses which allow both the Union and its Member States to promote communal 
moral standards by means of law. This EU public morality is pluralist in that it 
recognises that the primary forum within which ethical choices are made is still the 
individual Member State and therefore permits the recognition of differing national 
religious, cultural and moral viewpoints within EU law. However, membership of 
the Union also involves certain moral commitments and a degree of common 
agreement around fundamental political and legal values. Thus, an autonomous EU 
public morality also restricts the degree to which the particular moral choices of 
individual Member States can be reflected in EU law. These restrictions require that 
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the ethical choices of Member States do not deviate from the common European 
element of EU public morality requires that such choices respect requirements of 
proportionality, coherence and respect for free movement rights as well as reflecting 
the notion of fair balance between religious, cultural and humanist influences 
inherent in the Union’s fundamental rights commitments and public morality.  
Such an approach to public morality has much in common with MacCormick’s 
notion of the Union as characterised by a legal pluralism characterised by the 
interaction of legal systems.175 Indeed, the analogy can extend to other areas of EU 
law such as freedom of movement where one could argue that, just as EU law 
requires that national regulatory decisions take into account the principle of free 
movement of goods, similarly it requires that national ethical choices take into 
account the moral commitments of EU membership embodied by the Union’s public 
morality and fundamental rights commitments. This is seen in the judgments in 
Promusicae and Omega which indicated that what is required is that Member States 
take account of the various “goods” and elements of public morality recognised by 
EU law in coming to their ethical decisions.  
Although the Union has adhered to a relatively strict formal neutrality in its dealings 
with religions, these “goods” and the notion of what constitutes a fair balance 
between competing rights are both, of course, influenced by European culture and 
history. Indeed, the importance of Europe’s ethical and religious “inheritance” in the 
determination of the content of the public morality of the EU has been explicitly 
acknowledged in the Treaties. Combined with deference towards Member State 
cultural and moral autonomy and the promotion of the notion of balance between 
religious and humanist influences, the notion of respect for an ethical inheritance 
permits culturally entrenched Christian religions and those faiths which can 
reconcile themselves to limitation on religious influence which respect for Europe’s 
humanist tradition entails, to exercise greater influence over EU law. Nevertheless, 
the Union recognises the complexity of the relationship between liberal democracy 
                                                        
175 N. MacCormick, “The Maastricht Urteil: Sovereignty Now” (1995) 1 European Law Journal 259, 
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and religion in general and provides limits to the public ambitions of all faiths, even 
those with strong humanist traditions and deep cultural roots in Europe. Thus the 
notion of balance can be seen as attempting to reconcile religion’s important role in 
communal identity with protection of individual identity rights, including the right 
not to be forced to adhere to particular religiously-inspired communal moral norms 
which derive in part from the humanist elements of the Union’s public order. 
The Union’s public morality therefore upholds the broad outlines of the balance 
between religion and secular humanist balance in Europe and the cultural values and 
way of life to which this balance gives rise. Its approach is not religiously neutral and 
exhibits a preference for culturally-entrenched faiths which play strong roles in 
communal cultural identities in Europe and which can reconcile themselves to the 
notion of balance between humanist and religious influences. Those religions which 
do not exercise significant cultural influence in a Member State, which are opposed 
to certain shared European cultural norms or which are anti-humanist are largely 
excluded from influence and are, at least implicitly, identified as in some ways 
contrary to the Union’s public morality and notion of the good. On the other hand, 
religions such as mainstream Christian churches which have deep cultural roots and 
which have a strong humanist tradition may find that they exercise a far greater 
influence over European public morality than other faiths. Nevertheless, although 
the strong humanist elements of European public morality, and the secular 
influences which they gave rise to, may owe something to Christian humanism, they 
also provide powerful limitations on the influence which all religions, including 
Christianity can exercise over the law. Thus, the Union’s approach is characterised 
by a complex and shifting balance between religious, cultural and humanist 
influences. This balance is struck in a pluralist context which attempts to reconcile 
the differing balances between such influences in individual Member States with the 
need to maintain the open and sufficiently religiously neutral common European 
ethical framework necessary for the functioning of the Union as a polity. 
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